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The development of communications satellites raises, as a major
public issue, the perennial problem of introducing a new technology
into an existing industry. The extraordinary concern with satellite
communication arises from its vast potential for social benefit and
commercial gain. Satellites offer reliable, instantaneous and inexpen-
sive communications among widely-scattered points, many of which
cannot support equivalent cable facilities.' Once an international satel-
lite network is established, it promises to transform the world economy,
bringing particular benefits to less-developed areas.2 Satellite com-
t Professor of Law, State University, New York Law School. A.B. 1953, LL.B. 1956,
Harvard University.
This article was prepared with the assistance of a grant from the Graduate School of
Arts and Sciences, State University, New York at Buffalo. I wish to thank members of the
Federal Communications Commission and industry legal staffs for their assistance. None
of them can be held responsible for the views expressed herein.
1. For a thoughtful survey of some social implications of satellite technology, see
Dallas W. Smythe, On Thinking About the Effects of Communications Satellites, October,
1964 (mimeo); see also Address by John A. Johnson, Satellite Communications: Some
International, Political and Economic Implications, American Life Convention, Toronto,
Canada, Oct. 13, 1965.
2. Similar benefits are available for communications between distant parts of the same
country, and, with low satellite costs, perhaps for shorter distances as welL Domestic uses
may thus come to account for the bulk of satellite business. Gould, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1966, § 3, p. 8A, col. 1; Hearings on Government Use of Satellite Communications Before
the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 510 (1966) (testimony of Comsat Chairman James McCormack)
[hereinafter cited as 1966 Holifield Hearings]. The future of educational television may
depend on how satellites will be utilized for such transmission. Hearings on Progress
Report on Space Communications Before Communications Subcommittee of Senate Com-
merce Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-87 (1966) (statements by McGeorge Bundy and
Fred Friendly) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Commerce Committee Hearing]. And, as
satellite communication develops, more uses will be conceived, including airline com-
munications, which will greatly improve air safety, and weather satellites, House Comm.
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munication, like so much post-war technology, is a beneficiary of the
federal funds which have financed over two-thirds of our national
research and development effort during the past ten years.3 As the
guardian of the national economy, the government would in any event
have had an interest in the course of communications satellite develop-
ment, but this financial stake has made satellite communication even
more clearly a public policy issue. Finally, the industries most directly
involved-communications and aerospace-are either monopolistic or
oligopolistic, powerful and prosperous, and thus natural objects of
public concern.
In theory, satellite communication was susceptible to any number of
institutional arrangements. The new technology could have been turned
over to the existing industry, vested in a new private organization or
government enterprise, or simply made available to all. 4 From among
these alternatives, Congress chose in 1962 to create Comsat, a heavily
regulated "meld of variegated interests," which divided ownership
and control of satellite technology among the communications common
carriers, the general public and the government.5 Common stock owner-
ship was split equally between the general public and the carriers, each
of which is to select six-directors. The President of the United States,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, chooses three.0
on Government Operations, Government Use of Communications Satellites, H.R. REP.
No. 2318, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-72 (1966). Computer-to-computer usage will become
especially important.
3. See e.g., Hearings on H.R. 14921 Before the Senate Independent Offices Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1492 (1966); Barber,
Economic and Legal Problems of Government Patent Policies, A Report for the Monopoly
Subcommittee of the Senate Small Business Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1963).
The communications industry accounts for an especially large portion of this govern-
mentally financed research. Ibid. See also Hearings on National Communications Satellite
Programs before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8, 9, 30, 64-72, 99 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Senate Space Committee
Hearings].
4. The problems involved in how best to develop satellite communications are variants
of the more fundamental concern with how the State can best promote economic and social
development. Similar issues were raised in the 19th century debates over internal improve.
ments, and also in earlier state and local attempts to assist and develop industry. See gener-
ally GooDIucH, GOVERNMENT PRoMOTIoN OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS, 1800-1890
(1960); HAxrz, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THIOUGHT (1948); Schwartz, Govern.
mentally Appointed Directors In A Private Corporation-The Communications Satellite
Act of 1962, 79 HARv. L. Ray. 350, 357-61 (1965). More recent controversies have involved
government patent policy, Leontief, On Assignment of Patent Rights On Inventions
Made Under Government Research Contracts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 492 (1964), and atomic
energy development, Newman, The Atomic Energy Industry: An Experiment in Hybrid.
ization, 60 YALE L.J. 1263 (1951).
5. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 419, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Comsat Act]. The phrase "meld of variegated interests" was used by
FCC Chairman Rosel H. Hyde in a talk in 1964.
6. Comsat Act, §§ 304(b)(2), 303(a), 47 U.S.C. §§ 734(b)(2), 733(a).
The Act also provides for non-voting securities which have no ownership limitations
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The 1662 Act gave only the satellites themselves to Comsat.7 Con-
gress left it to the FCC to decide ownership and control of the earth
stations which relay messages to and from the satellites in the sky.8 On
December 8, 1966, the Commission ruled that in order to avoid delay in
establishing the satellite system, each of the six initial earth stations in
the continental United States, Hawaii and Puerto Rico is to be owned
jointly by Comsat and the carriers. Comsat will have 50 per cent owner-
ship, and the carriers are to divide the rest according to anticipated
proportionate use.9 This policy, which is to be reviewed in late 1969,
is designed (1) to enable all participants to contribute to the art and
to gain experience in the field; (2) to maximize carrier incentive to use
the system; (3) to facilitate orderly planning for new satellite, cable
and other facilities; and (4) to enable a united American telecommu-
nications industry to deal more effectively with foreign correspon-
dents.10 It overrules the Commission's earlier decision in May 1965
giving Comsat exclusive ownership" and control of the first three
and which may be includible in a carrier's rate base. Comsat Act, § 304(c), 47 U.S.C.
§ 734(c). For a discussion of these securities, see text accompanying note 33 infra.
The function and utility of the governmentally appointed directors are discussed in
Schwartz, supra note 4. For the best analyses of the legislation, see Note, The Corn-
munications Satellite Act of 1962, 76 HARv. L. Rnv. 388 (1962) and Levin, Organization
and Control of Communications Satellites, 113 U. PA. L. RFv. 315 (1965).
The corporation was incorporated in the District of Columbia on February 1, 1963, and
is commonly called "Comsat."
7. The satellites are now the property of an international consortium of which
Comsat is a member, with an approximately 55 per cent interest. 1966 Commerce Com-
mittee Hearings 4-5 (testimony of FCC Chairman Rosel H. Hyde).
8. Comsat Act, § 201(c)(7), 47 U.S.C. § 721, directs the FCC to:
grant appropriate authorizations for the construction and operation of each satellite
terminal station, either to the corporation or to one or more authorized carriers or
to the corporation and one or more such carriers jointly, as will best serve the public
interest, convenience, and necessity. In determining public interest, convenience and
necessity the Commission shall authorize the construction and operation of such
stations by communications common carriers or the corporation, without preference
to either ....
The legislative history shows a series of twists and turns on this issue. The original
administration bill gave both the satellites and the stations to Comsat. See S. 2814, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 103(l), 305(a)(1), reprinted in Hearings on Antitrust Problems of tile
Space Satellite Communications System Before the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 233 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Kefauver Hearings). After the Administration bill was compromised with the
bill introduced by Senator Robert S. Kerr (which would have turned the whole system
over to the carriers, see S. 2650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in Kefatwer Hearings,
pt. 1, at 238) a provision "encouraging" carrier ownership of the stations was inserted.
However, Comsat retained the satellites, and the FCC could still awvard Comsat the
stations. See S. REP. No. 1319, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962). An amendment to strike this
preference from the House-passed version of the bill was defeated in the House floor
debate, 108 CONG. REc. 7524-26, 7697-7704 (May 2, 3, 1962), but the preference was com-
pletely deleted in the final version. See S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 18 (1962.
9. 5 F.C.C.2d 812, Dkt. No. 15735 (Dec. 8, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Second Report].
10. Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 816.
11. 38 F.C.C. 1104 (1965) [hereinafter cited as First Report], reaff'd, F.C.C. 66-176 at 5
(Feb. 25, 1966). Although the 1965 decision did not explicitly authorize Comsat to own
the stations, all parties, including the Commission, have so construed it. See, e.g., Second
Report, 5 F.C.C.2d 812.
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stations for two years from the date the first license was granted, a
period which has not yet expired.12 The rationale of that decision was
also expeditious satellite development.
The earth station problem dramatizes the difficulty of using an estab-
lished regulated industry, with a heavy fixed investment in old equip.
ment, to introduce a new technology. 1 The carriers' knowledge and
experience might have been unavailable to the satellite enterprise
unless they were allowed to participate in ownership and control of
the stations. And as a practical matter an ownership interest may have
been the only way of allowing them to include satellite plant in their
rate base and thereby derive some earnings from the new technology.
The carriers, however, have much larger investments in conventional
cable and radio facilities, which may be jeopardized by rapid satellite
development. The battle for communications supremacy between cables
and satellites is one of the most significant results of satellite technology,
and allowing the carriers to control satellite development could preju-
dice its future.
The carriers also face direct Comsat competition for the communica-
tions business of the ultimate user. A desire to make the communica-
tions industry more competitive is manifest in both the legislation and
its history,14 and direct competition by Comsat may be one of the few
ways of introducing meaningful price and service rivalry into a domi-
nant-firm oligopoly like the communications industry. Comsat might
also make the communications industry a better customer for suppliers
who are not connected with the leading firms. On the other hand, with
monopolistic control of all satellite technology Comsat might over.
whelm many of the other firms. Also it is not clear that this industry,
despite its imperfect structure, requires an additional vigorous com-
petitor since its pricing and entry decisions are regulated, nor is it
certain that Congress wanted it so radically restructured. In their filings
for the First Report, the carriers stressed, with much apprehension, the
12. The First Report decision had another controversial aspect: it gave not only the
stations to Comsat but also a substantial share of the terrestrial facilities carrying the
traffic to the station. After very strong carrier protest, this part of the decision was
reversed in February, 1966. F.C.C. 66-176, supra note 11, at 6-9, 10. The Commission has
thus effected a complete reversal of its original decision, neatly dividing Its reversing
actions in proportion to the time elapsed-the terrestrial facilities issue was reversed
after the first 9V/ months, and earth station ownership after another 9!/2 months,
13. The introduction of such technology into a non-regulated context raises different
though equally difficult problems which will not be specifically discussed in this paper,
though some of the points made will be equally relevant to that context. For a few brief
but penetrating comments on these aspects of the problem, see HraLBoNER, Tl Liirrs
or CAPrrALsbi 96-100, 117-34 (1966).
14. See Comsat Act, § 102(c), 47 U.S.C. § 701(c); S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess,,
13-14 (1962).
444
Vol. 76: 441, 1967
Satellite Communications
link between earth station ownership and Comsat's ability to offer such
direct competition. The Commission, however, explicitly declared that
its decision giving Comsat an interim monopoly was not to affect the
latter question,'5 and a year later, in the authorized user decision, it
ruled that Comsat was not to offer services directly to anyone except
under "unique or exceptional" or "national interest" circumstances, to
be decided by the Commission.'"
This paper will be concerned with the soundness of the Second
Earth Station and the Authorized User decisions, as well as their
implications for the success of the Comsat experiment. It will try
to show that, as a "meld of variegated interests," Comsat is burdened
with too many conflicts of interest to operate effectively as this country's
chosen instrument for satellite communications, and that the Com-
mission's Earth Station ruling has compounded the problems; further,
that any progress toward achieving the legislative objectives has been
the result of a rare and perhaps temporary combination of vigorous and
effective regulation and aggressively independent management, which
have made up, in part, for Comsat's unwieldy structure.
I. Interests and Issues
A. Background-The Industry Structure
The communications common carrier industry is an oligopoly domi-
nated by AT&T, the largest corporation in America and one of the
most powerful in the world.'7 In domestic communications, AT&T
completely overshadows the rest of the industry, controlling 85 per cent
of the telephones in the United States, and monopolizing other services
such as inter-city television. The rest of the domestic industry is made
up of competing monopoly services, such as Western Union's telegraph
franchise, and a few services, such as teletypewriter exchange, in which
several firms including AT&T compete.
International communications, which at 22 per cent per year is the
faster growing segment of the industry, 8 is divided like domestic com-
15. See First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1119-20.
16. In the Matter of Authorized Entities and Authorized Users Under the Com-
munications Satellite Act of 1962, 4 F.C.C.2d 421 (1966) [hereinafter dited as Authorized
Users].
17. In 1965, AT&T had $33 billion in assets and $4.4 billion in net operating revenues
before taxes. Acm=cAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CoMIPANY, ANN. REP. 28, 30 (1965).
18. 1963 FCC REPoir 22 (1964); in 1965, total revenues from overseas communications
amounted to $222,700,000. See Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d at 432. It is expected that
demand will increase four-fold and maybe more in the next decade, particularly if rates
fall See REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS TO SENArE-HousE Co'r.rnrTErS OF Tran INrMOV-
E.NMENTAL CoMimrrrE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 20 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
INTRAGOVERNIENTAL CoMMrrrEE REPORT].
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munications into voice and record, such as telegraph and teletype.
AT&T has a monopoly of voice, while ITT, ROAC and WUI account
for the bulk of record and mixed voice-record communications.1 0 So far
record communications media still handle most of the international
traffic, but voice is rapidly increasing its share, as are hybrid services
such as alternate voice and record, dataphone, and television. These ser-
vices are hard to classify as voice or record, and there is some dissatisfac-
tion with the regulatory distinction between them, especially since there
are almost no technical differences in the means of transmission.20
At present, most overseas traffic moves via radio or high capacity
undersea cable. Originally, the international record carriers operated
almost exclusively over their own low-capacity telegraph cables. In the
early 1950's RCAC developed efficient radio communications, and the
other carriers followed suit. But the growth of voice and hybrid services
exhausted the potential of ordinary radio communication and created
a demand for the high-capacity undersea cables that AT&T alone started
to build in the mid-fifties after the other carriers declined an invitation
to participate. In 1964, the Commission, fearing the monopolistic power
inherent in exclusive cable ownership, granted the record carriers joint
ownership with AT&cT in the fourth transatlantic cable, as well as
indefeasible rights of user-which is tantamount to ownership-in the
first three. Additional plans are being made for other cables, also to be
jointly owned.
19. For a brief description of the overseas communications industry, see INTAGcOVERN-
MENTAL CormnrrEE REPORT 6-11; Communications Satellite Corporation Prospectus 22-28
(1964).
20. Messrs. Frederick A. Kappel and David Sarnoff, of AT&T and RCA respectively,
have noted that more facilities are becoming harder to classify because of the inter-
mixture of voice and record. See Sarnoff letter of June 27, 1963, to Senator Warren G,
Magnuson reprinted in 110 CONG. REc. A5965-66 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965). Dataphone and
television are good examples of such a mixture.
Professor Dallas W. Smythe, formerly FCC Chief Economist, has argued, on the other
hand, that the distinction is both technically and organizationally sound, and must be
maintained if the Bell system is not to drive all the other carriers out of existence.
Testimony in Domestic Telegraph Investigation, F.C.C. Dkt. No. 14650 at 6.11 (1963), He
would confine AT&T to pure voice communications, allowing the other carriers all the
other services. ITT's position also calls for maintaining the voice-record distinction. See
letter from ITT President Harold S. Geneen to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, reprinted
in 110 CONG. REc. A5965 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1963). General Sarnoff's solution to the
problem of AT&T competition is to merge all the carriers other than Bell. See 1966
Holifield Hearings 557-58.
Some of the record carriers have expressed fears that AT&T may try to use the blurring
of the voice-record distinction to expand its operations into record. See Response of
Western Union International to Replies of Other Carriers In the Matter of AT&T and
WUI Applications . . . to Lease and Operate Voice and Television Channels . . . fin]
the Communications Satellite System 8-10 (Aug. 27, 1965).
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B. The Rate Base Issue
Whatever the public interest in the Earth Station decision, part of the
carriers' motivation is simply that without earth station ownership their
prospects for significant profits from the satellite communications sys-
tem are poor. Investment in an earth station may be included in the rate
base and in the regulated communications industry, where a firm's
prices are set by regulation to produce a reasonable return"- on its
plant investment, earnings are directly related to the size of the rate
base.22 If the carriers do not own the earth station facilities and want
to use the satellite system, they will have to lease the space and earth
facilities. The rental payments for such leases, however, are not a source
of earnings for they are merely expenses which, although reimbursable
dollar for dollar, are excluded from the rate base.
Rate base disputes, of course, occur all the time, but this one is
crucial to the carriers, for the ground facilities are their only source
of substantial satellite rate base and earnings. The satellites them-
selves are the exclusive monopoly of Comsat and its foreign partners in
the international consortium, the carriers' present stock investments in
Comsat may not be included in their respective rate bases (unlike possi-
ble future issues under section 304(c) of the Act),2 and there are un-
likely to be substantial dividends on this common stock for some time.21
In addition, research and development expenses in connection with these
stations may also be eligible for inclusion in the iate base and thereby
become an additional source of earnings. Research also helps develop
competence and know-how that can lead to profitable contracts with
outsiders. Comsat and its carrier owners may thus compete with each
21. Setting a reasonable rate of return is, of course, one of the most difficult problems
in public utilities regulation. See generally BorNBmIGrr, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC U"ILITY
RAms chs. X-XV (1961). Because of the newness of the firm and the venture, setting
Comsat's rate of return for satellite service may be an especially difficult problem. This
problem is presently being considered by the FCC. See F.C.C. Dkt. No. 16070.
22. This may be at least one reason for the utilities' massive construction programs,
for in the utility industry, it is generally true that the more you invest, the more jou
earn. Shepherd, Utility Profits and Growth Under Regulation, in UrTr" R.uEA. o.n-
Nwv DnREcONS IN THEORY AND POLICY 3, 31-34 (Shepherd & Gies eds. 196M. Comsat
President Charyk has suggested that because less plant investment will be needed for
future communications uses, the rate base method ought perhaps be abandoned for
communications rate making. 1966 Holifield Hearings 515. See text accompanying note 82
infra.
23. See notes 6 supra and 33 infra. Under an earlier draft, the carriers' Yoting stock
might have been includible in the rate base. Testimony of FCC Common Carrier Bureau
Chief Bernard Strassburg at Kefauver Hearings 338. Issues of section 304(c) stock are
probably some time away. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
24. Even if dividends were more likely, the after-tax return to the carriers is but a
fraction of what they could obtain on their own rate base.
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other for Government research business2 and for contracts relating
to the construction of new or foreign earth stations. Carriers have even
claimed that without direct interest in the earth stations, they may be
unable to continue research on earth station technology and therefore
unable to compete for future earth station construction either in the
United States26 or abroad.
On this relatively narrow issue of rate base allocation, Comsat has
one very strong and simple argument: it desperately needs immediate
investment outlets, and far more so than the carriers. Comsat obtained
almost $200 million in cash from its initial common stock issue, and
expects at least $80 million more from its foreign partners; improving
technology, however, has sharply reduced the anticipated cost of the
system.27 Although it has been spending money on research and on a
few satellites, at the moment it has relatively few substantial investment
outlets other than stations.28 An earth station monopoly could con-
tribute significantly to Comsat's rate base, for the stations, each of which
is estimated to cost some $6.5 million, are expected to account for at
least 50 per cent of the satellite system investment and perhaps very
much more.29 Dividing the stations between Comsat and the carriers
would thus reduce Comsat's total plant by at least 25 per cent, while
25. 31 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORT 25 (June 21, 1965); Hearings on Nomination of
Incorporators Before Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee 82, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1968) (testimony of former Comsat Director Leonard Marks).
26. Petition of ITT World Communications Inc. for Reconsideration by the Com-
mission of its Interim Policy 8 (June 10, 1965).
27. Present estimates are that Comsat's share of the cost will be about half the original
estimates. Address by A. Bruce Matthews, Comsat Financial Vice President and Treasurer,
before Financial Analysts of Philadelphia, Feb. 2, 1967; see note 29 infra.
The fact that Comsat's capital is entirely equity, and that it will have no need to
borrow money for some time aggravates Comsat's plight, for equity capital is far more
expensive than debt and requires a far higher rate of return, thus requiring higher
customer charges. Indeed, Comsat's currently high rates are one reason for Its relatively
low operating revenues so far. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1966, § 3, p. 1, col. 3. Since
Comsat's future success depends on low price-high volume service, it is important for
Comsat to float bond issues, but without the need for such capital, it is difficult to see
how the Commission could authorize such financing, under Comsat Act, § 201(c)(7), 47
U.S.C. § 721(c), which requires FCC approval of all financing. The small likelihood that
Comsat will resort soon to the bond market for debt financing was recently noted by
management. COMMUNICATIONS SATELLTrrE COPoxoTN, REP. OF 1966 ANN. MEEMNG (May
10, 1966).
28. See The Company Nobody Knows, Forbes, Jan. 15, 1965, pp. 19, 20. As of See-
tember, 1966, Comsat's rate base was still only $13 million. 1966 Holifield Hearings 366
(testimony of Director of Telecommunications Planning James D. O'Connell). It ap-
parently anticipates a rate base of from $62 to $95 million.
29. Originally, it was thought that the space segment and the earth stations would
each require a heavy investment, and hence the $200 million initial issue. But this
calculation assumed a random orbit system requiring some 80-40 satellites and, very com-
plex earth stations. The synchronous system, however, involves only a few satellites and
thus a small investment in the space segment. See 1966 Commerce Committee Hearings
126-27 (testimony of Comsat Chairman McCormack).
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adding relatively little to most of the carriers. 0 Indeed, as the table
shows the Commission's allocation of partial carrier ownership will pro-
vide rate base increments for the record carriers ranging from 4.75 per
cent (RCAC) to 7.5 per cent (WUI); the aggregate increment for all the
carriers will be only 4 per cent."'
International Earth Station
Rate Base Increment
(millions) (millions) % Increment
ITT 50 2.9 5.8
RCAC 80 3.7 4.75
WUJI 19 1.5 7.5
All international carriers 490 19.5 4.0
Each carrier also has an expanding cable system, which will increase its
rate base apart from satellites and at a much faster rate.3- And the FCC
can give them an additional opportunity to increase their rate base by
buying section 304(c) stock, which is "eligible for inclusion in the rate
base to the extent allowed by the Commission." 3 It is also unlikely that
the carriers will substantially reduce research if denied ownership,
because they have been building earth stations in other parts of the
world,34 and have been working with Comsat on stations in this coun-
try.35 Thus, Comsat Chairman McCormack's characterization of the
financial investment in the U.S. earth stations as being "significant to
30. 1966 Holifield Hearings 366 (testimony of Associate Director of Telecommunica-
tions Planning Fred W. Morris, Jr.).
31. The rate base figures, which are approximate only, appear in 1966 Holifleld
Hearings 866-67. Separate information as to AT&T's international rate bare was not
provided. The allocation figures are in Second Report. 5 F.C.C2d at 819. Other shares
went to Hawaiian Telephone Corp. and to a local ITT-owned telephone company in the
Caribbean. Ibid.
52. One cable in the Caribbean, ownership of which will be shared according to ex-
pected use, will cost $33 million.
33. Comsat Act, § 304(c), 47 U.S.C. § 734(c), provides:
The corporation is authorized to issue, in addition to the stock authorized by
subsection (a) of this section, nonvoting securities, bonds, debentures, and other
certificates of indebtedness as it may determine. Such nonvoting securities, bonds,
debentures, or other certificates of indebtedness of the corporation as a communica-
tions common carrier may own shall be eligible for inclusion in the rate base of the
carrier to the extent allowed by the Commission. The voting stock of the corpora-
tion shall not be eligible for indusion in the rate base of the carrier.
Through their 50 per cent stock ownership of Comsat, the carriers will also obtain,
ultimately, at least some benefit from Comsat earth station ownership, but probably only
a fraction of what they could obtain by direct ownership. Their precise benefit will
depend upon the dividend pay-out ratio and the tax rates.
34. ITT is constructing terminals in Latin America, see Application of ITT Cable &
Radio, Inc.-Puerto Rico for authority to construct a Satellite Earth Station in Puerto
Rico . . . 8 (Nov. 22, 1965), and in Spain. See Earth Stations Backgrounder issued by
Comsat 10 (Fall 1966); RCA is involved in earth station construction in Canada, id. at 22,
and the Philippines.
35. See Comsat Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders to be held May 10, 1966,
at 8-10 (April 7, 1966).
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the other carriers, especially the smaller overseas record carriers," but
"vital to Comsat" is understandable. 6
C. Expeditious Development-The Satellite-Cable Competition
It thus seems that the carriers' sharp responses to a possible Comsat
monopoly of earth stations must have been based not so much on con-
cern for the small rate base increments represented by the earth stations
but on something much more fundamental-the threat that satellites
present to their existing and planned rate base consisting of cable and
radio facilities, a threat which vitally affects the "expeditious develop-
ment" of the satellite venture and the future of the communications
industry.
It was early recognized that a satellite system might well be much
cheaper and more versatile than conventional cable and radio facil-
ities,37 although steady improvement in cable technology may overcome
this trend.88 Technically satellites are more flexible than cables. They
are not limited to point to point communication, and their capacity,
presently much greater than cables, can be expanded without great
difficulty. On the other hand, cables may be more economical for
shorter distances.8 9 Unlike satellites, they do not consume the already
overcrowded radio frequency spectrum, and there may be a troubling
echo effect for long-distance, two-way satellite communication. 40 More-
over, the development of cable technology is expected to cut cable
costs and increase cable capacity enormously.41 At present there is more
than enough demand in most parts of the world for existing cable and
satellite facilities. But before long surplus capacity may develop, 42 and
cable-satellite competition could then become highly intensive, espe.
36. 1966 Commerce Committee Hearings 133.
37. Id. at 65 (O'Connell); Western Union has estimated that satellites are cheaper
than cables at distances of 1000 miles or more. Application by the Western Union
Telegraph Co. for Authority to Construct and Operate a Domestic Earth Station in
Colorado, pt. I, at 8 (Nov. 7, 1966).
38. Letter from RCA Chairman David Sarnoff to Communications Satellite Corporation
Chairman Leo D. Welsh, April 2, 1963, reprinted in 110 CoNG. REc. 9208-09, (daily ed.
May 28, 1963) (new transistorized cables with capacity increased to 720 voice circuits will
seriously impair Comsat profit possibilities); cf. Rand Corp. Submarine Telephone Cables
and International Communications, Memo RM-3472-RC 12 (Feb. 1963); 1966 Senate Space
Committee Hearings 100-01 (O'Connell).
39. See 1966 Holifield Hearings 516 (McCormack). But see 33 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REPORTs 23 (Feb. 23, 1967) (possibility of economical satellite use for short distances).
40. But see Wall St. Journal, Aug. 2, 1965, p. 1, col. 8 (echo not significant),
41. See authorities cited note 38 infra; 1966 Holifield Hearings 529-30, 533 (AT&T
views).
42. See INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COMMrTTEE REPORT 18-19. This may be true in Pacific
if the present Vietnam crisis ends, for our present needs arise largely out of our military
involvement in South East Asia. 1966 Holifield Hearings 44 (statement of Lt, Gcn. Alfred
D. Starbird, Director, Defense Communications Agency).
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cially since communications is an industry of declining costs and earn-
ings are directly related to volume.4
If satellites were to prevail in this competition, or even if they merely
obtained a substantial part of the business, there would be little justi-
fication for substantial additional cable investment, and earnings might
drop on the carriers' already heavy investment in cables and radio."
Then if the carriers were also denied rate base use of the satellite plant,
they might well be left with a depreciating and declining portion of
the industry's communications plant.4a The carriers could conceivably
be relegated to moving messages from the customer to Comsat, a task
which requires relatively little plant investment. Although this is
hardly an urgent problem for the mammoth Bell system, which is al-
ways likely to have a vast amount of non-satellite business, the prospect
is far more serious for the international record carriers whose entire
carrier business is involved.40
The cable-satellite conflict and its effect on expeditious development
of a satellite system cast a shadow on the legislative debate over the
Communication Satellite Act. The carriers and the FCC feared the
threat to existing investment if the carriers did not control the tech-
nology, while the opponents feared impediments to expeditious devel-
opment if they did.4 7 Exactly the same considerations apply to earth
43. The first head-on confrontation between cables and satellites has already taken
place in connection with providing much needed new facilities in the Caribbean, and
the result is a draw: the FCC has authorized both a cable and an earth station on the
grounds that (1) the expected traffic can support both facilities, especially since AT&T
and ITT, the two carriers who petitioned for the cable, have agreed to lease 100 satellite
circuits; (2) having two types of facilities would provide a necessary redundancy in case
one of the facilities suffers an outage; and (3) authorizing a new transistorized, high.
capacity cable as well as satellite traffic would facilitate development of cable technology,
which the Commission found to be still in the public interest, and permit a direct
comparison between the two facilities. See Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 823, 828, 830-31.
44. For many years AT&T, some of its foreign partners such as the British, and, to
a lesser but increasing extent, the record carriers, have been building vast and expensive
cable systems, all of which go into the carriers' respective rate bases if kept in service.
The present investment in such cables is over $600 million and by 1970, it is expected
to be about $1 billion. Wall St. Journal, July 18, 1963, p. 1, coL 6. See generally Communi-
cations Satellite Corporation Prospectus 22-23 (1964). For this and other reasons, the
British and some other Europeans are less than whofly enthusiastic about satellites. Wall
St. Journal, Aug. 2, 1965, p. 1, col. 6; 1966 Senate Space Committee Hearings 100 (O'Con-
nell); 1966 Holifield Hearings 324 (O'Connell).
45. They -would be faced with the prospect of ever diminishing rate bases, both in
the absolute and relative senses, and would be driven to seek alternative means not
necessarily dictated by efficiency but by need for survival.
Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 815.
46. The carriers' desire for earth station ownership apparently goes back to the earliest
days of the satellite experience. 1966 Holifield Hearings 365 (O'Connell).
47. Compare Kefauver Hearings, pt. 2, at 328-29, (FCC Commissioner T. A. M.
Craven) and 1962 Senate Space Committee Hearings 294 (ITT Vice President Henri
Busignies) with id. at 412-13 (Deputy Attorney General Nicholas de B. Iatzenbach) and
1956 Holifield Hearings 367 (O'Connell). This concern is not peculiar to satellite develop-
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station ownership, for satellite capacity, and hence satellite rates, de-
pend directly on the size and efficiency of the stations. It is therefore
arguable that only an entity devoted solely to satellites and with no
mixed feelings about their displacement of established technology,
should be entrusted with this difficult task, and in the First Earth
Station decision, the Commission apparently agreed. 48
On the other hand, excluding the carriers from the satellite system
would not eliminate the danger of delay. The carriers are Comsat's
main customers and Comsat depends on them to direct traffic to the
satellites. As an ITT spokesman indicated, if the carriers were not
given control over this technology which could "seriously dilute" their
existing investment,
it would then be the duty of the common carriers to their stock-
holders to avoid such dilution, insofar as possible, which would
undoubtedly tend to reduce their use of the satellite system in
favor of the existing systems which they own.4 9 (Emphasis added.)
The same boycott threat was made in the earth station controversy,
where ITT and RCA warned that without at least part ownership of
the earth stations, they would have no incentive to use the satellite
system and would rely on their own facilities instead.80 The Authorized
User decision,' 1 which generally precludes Comsat from dealing directly
with the ultimate user, reinforces the carrier's ability to avoid the
satellite system. Under that decision, the carriers will control the choice
of facilities, and if all other things are equal, they can simply divert
most traffic to their own cable facilities. If a substantial boycott were car-
ried out, it would hinder the development of inexpensive services, since
satellite communication involves sharply decreasing costs, and maxi-
ment but is reflected in long-standing policies in both the transportation and communi-
cations industries whereby established industry members are either flatly prohibited
from owning other modes of service, or otherwise restricted. See 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1964) (railroads and water carriers); 72 Stat. 767 (1958), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) (surface and air carriers); 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 314 (1964) (radio and wire communications). See Hearings on S. 2814 and
S. 2814 Amendment Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess,
273-74 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Commerce Committee Hearings]; FULDA, COwt-
PETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIEs-TRANSPORTATION ch. 12 (1961); Cramton, 19 ABA
ANTrnusT SECrION 364 (1961); L. B. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Reg-
ulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 4AilV. L. REv. 436, 460-63
(1954).
48. First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1113, 31.
49. 1962 Senate Space Committee Hearings 294 (Busignies). For evidence that this has
happened see 1966 Senate Space Committee Hearings 100 (O'Connell), and for a more
generalized statement of some of the reasons underlying such a decision see CLAR , STUDIES
IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS 145 (1923).
50. Cf. First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1110; id. at 1126 (dissent).
51. Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d 421 (1966).
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mum efficiency can be achieved only through full use of the facilities.
The boycott threat does not seem too serious, however, at least for the
near future.52 The success of a boycott would depend on the availability
of other facilities, and in the next few years such facilities will probably
be in critically short supply. Even after the 1965 Earth Station decision,
the carriers asked for far more channels than were available.0 When a
voracious demand for television channels and private data transmission
develops, there is likely to be a period of acute shortage. Moreover,
Comsat may not be wholly dependent on the record carriers, for it is
likely to obtain a heavy volume of business from AT&T and the
Government. The former requested 100 channels as early as December
1963, 54 and cheap satellite channels would attract heavy demand from
NASA and the Defense'Department. 5
On the other hand, even if the carriers own earth stations and have
some satellite rate base, they will still be biased toward their own
facilities, representing a much larger investment. The Commission
itself recognized the latter point in its Earth Station, Authorized User
and Caribbean decisions, and suggested one way of preventing a boy-
cott: the Commission required the carriers constructing the Caribbean
cable to ensure that satellites get a proper share of the traffic,60 and in
the Authorized User decision warned that it would allow Comsat to
offer direct service if the carriers refused to use available satellite
capacity upon reasonable demand therefor5 7
Despite these considerations, the Commission ruled that partial car-
rier ownership was necessary to ensure expeditious development of the
system. Pointing to the enormous volume of pleadings and comments
filed with the Commission on various aspects of the earth station issue,
and stressing the urgency of determining certain competing applica-
tions without a full dress hearing, the Commission concluded that
ownership of all six initial stations should be shared between Comsat
and the carriers. It refused to extend its 1965 decision giving Comsat
a temporary monopoly of the first three stations to the three additional
stations, on the ground that this would
52. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
53. Letter from Ben F. Waple, Secretary. FCC, to Herman Schwartz, Feb. 13, 1967.
54. S0 TELEcorttuNicAioNs RrPoRTs 1-3 (Dec. 16, 1963).
55. The Apollo program alone is likely to pay the bill for a large portion of Comsats
operations for the next few years. See MAisile and Space Ground Support Operations, HIR
RE. No. 1340, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. ch. 6 (1966).
56. Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 831-32; cf. id. at 816 n.7.
57. Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d at 435.
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.. be contrary to the spirit and intent of Congress... in Section
201(c)(7); e.g., see Senate Report No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
page 18. Under such a course the carriers would not, for the ex-
tended period of time, be in a position to make meaningful con-
tribution [sic] to the development of the art and their incentives to
aid in the growth of satellite communications would be severely
limited. They would be faced with the prospect of ever diminish-
ing rate bases, both in the absolute and relative senses, and would
be driven to seek alternative means not necessarily dictated by
efficiency but by need for survival.58
The Commission also rejected the alternative of assigning different
stations to different carriers, both for technical reasons and because it
would
fragment responsibility, and control of what must be a unified
system at this stage of development of the act when proliferation
of earth stations is neither technically nor economically feasible.60
The Commission concluded that joint ownership, with Comsat as
manager subject to a committee of the particular carriers owning the
particular stations, was best because:
reasonable and equitable opportunities would thereby be offered
all entities which make use of the satellite facilities to make what-
ever contributions they can to the advance of the art and to the
achievement of the objectives of the Satellite Act. No one carrier
or group of carriers would be precluded from gaining valuable
experience in this field. Ownership participation and investment
would provide powerful incentives to maximize use. Orderly
planning of needed new cables, satellite, and other facilities would
be facilitated so that the inherent advantages of each could be
exploited to the maximum. The United States telecommunications
industry would be in a position to deal on equal terms with its
foreign correspondents which, for the most part, have unified
cable and satellite interests. 60
The Commission thereupon allocated carrier shares according to ex-
pected use61 and pledged to review the policy at the end of 1969.
Although it is hard to fault a compromise apparently accepted by
the party most adversely affected, 62 most of the Commission's reasons
58. Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 815.
59. Ibid.
60. Id. at 816.
61. The carriers had been unable to agree on their shares among themselves. Id. at
818.
62. Comsat expressed willingness to accept joint ownership. See id. at 817. A Comsat
shareholder has recently filed a protest with the Commission. 33 TELECONINIUNICATONs
RrPoRTs 36 (Jan. 30, 1967).
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for allowing carrier participation in ownership are not entirely con-
vincing and are inconsistent with its analysis of these same considera-
tions announced less than twenty months earlier, and reaffirmed con-
fidently less than ten months earlier. Furthermore, the Commission's
joint ownership and committee arrangements could adversely affect not
only earth station technology63 and the satellite venture but the possi-
bilities, currently much mooted, of merging some or all of the interna-
tional carriers.
Some of the Commission's reasons have already been considered
earlier, such as the contention that ownership is necessary for the
carriers to contribute to the art, and the problem of carrier incentive
to use the system. Indeed, the very same contentions were made by the
carriers and flatly rejected by the Commission in its 1965 decision,
though for reasons other than those set forth here. As to the first, the
Commission then declared that Comsat could benefit from the carriers'
knowledge through the carriers' representatives on its board, and from
the normal interchange of information between a monopolistic supplier
and its customers.64 It also refused to take seriously the threats of boy-
cott on the ground that the carriers' stock investment in Comsat would
impel them to use it to the maximum. 0 As to effective dealing with
foreign correspondents, the Commission in 1965 concluded that only
full Comsat ownership would enable Comsat to best represent Amer-
ican interests. 6 And as to the rate base problem-which the Com-
mission did not discuss in its first decision-the relevant considerations
have already been discussed and will be returned to later. The Com-
mission's First Report also seemed to give some weight to Comsat's
contention that its sole reliance on satellites made it the most "reliable"
entity to develop the system, 7 but in December 1966 it only mentioned
this factor as one that it had taken into account.68
The only really new consideration in the December opinion is the
Commission's deduction from legislative history that to give Comsat
a monopoly "would be contrary to the spirit and intent of Congress
63. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
64. First Report, 58 F.C.C. at 1114-15.
65. This ignores the relatively small size of most carriers' investments and the even
smaller likelihood of substantial profits for some time. Indeed this investment was
probably made more for control than for income, since at the time of issue, most profes-
sional securities analysts considered the stock a poor investment because of the inevitably
long wait for earnings. The experts failed to anticipate the glamour of the stock which
has gone as high as 71, from an issue price of 20. Most of the time, it has been in the
40's and 50's.
66. First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1113.
67. See ibid.
68. Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 818.
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in Section 201(c)(7); e.g., Senate Report No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
page 18." There is very little to support such a "spirit and intent."
In the first place, section 201(c)(7) clearly allows a Comsat monopoly
as one of its alternatives. 69 It is true that the Committee Report de-
scribed some of the carriers' arguments for carrier ownership, 0 as
significant factors which are directly related to the public interest,
convenience and necessity, and which should be taken fully into
account by the Commission along with all other relevant fac-
tors ....
But it went on to say:
While the common carriers have urged the desirability of their
operation of ground stations, it does not seem appropriate to legis-
latively limit the Commission in the exercise of its licensing func-
tions. In view of the various statements made throughout the
numerous hearings on this proposal, your committee's intention
must be made quite clear.
It is for this reason that the second sentence that appears in
S. 2814, section 201(c)(7), as reported by the Senate Aeronautical
and Space Committee, which provides that the Commission should
'encourage' establishment of ground stations by the carriers has
been changed to provide that there shall be no preference shown
either to the corporation or the carriers.
The intention of this change in language is to make clear that
there is no legislative prejudgment as to who shall establish a
ground terminal station. The Commission is authorized to give
full consideration to all relevant technological, economic, and
operating factors in determining what meets the public interest,
convenience, and necessity.71
Thus, it seems clear that the Commission had complete discretion on
this question, a discretion which would seem especially appropriate
with respect to interim ownership control.7 2
The two decisions are in sharpest disagreement on the paramount
69. The concluding phrase "without preference to either" was expressly inserted to
replace and negate a much-disputed provision in the House-passed version of the bill
which gave a preference to the carriers. See note 8 supra. Had Congress intended to limit
the Commission in any way, it surely could have done so, and indeed, as noted earlier,
the House unsuccessfully made such an attempt. Ibid.
70. These consisted of the arguments that (1) since it is the carriers who directly
serve the public, they should therefore have undivided responsibility; and (2) the carriers
have experience and expertise with earth stations. S. REP,. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess,
18 (1962).
71. Ibid. (Emphasis added).
72. Interestingly, the Commission's First Report nowhere mentioned even a carrier
claim that congressional intent pointed toward joint interim ownership; indeed, if the
Commission's December 1966 reading of such "spirit and intent" is correct, did tih
Commission contravene that intent in May 196R
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issue: how will sharing responsibility and control of the stations affect
development of the satellite system? In 1965, the Commission reasoned
that the "centralized authority" of a Comsat monopoly was necessary
to avoid "the risk of delay, uncertainty and compromise which would
be involved if the carriers were to have direct ownership interest and
a voice in the management decisions."7 3
And in February 1966, the Commission noted with satisfaction that
the rapid technological and accelerated requirements for the avail-
ability of facilities, particularly in connection with the Apollo
program, indicate to us that the advantages we envisaged would
result from a centralization of responsibility and control in Comsat
are even greater than appeared when we first considered the mat-
ter.74
But is there now less need for centralized authority? If not, why is
there now reason to think that these committees will be able to operate
efficiently, when 19 months ago it was most confidently thought other-
wise? Won't the "negative control" given the carriers by their 50 per
cent ownership continue to involve "the risk of diluting responsibility,
... delays .... undesirable compromises [and] uncertainties"?7  % Ex-
perience during the period does not offer much hope of smooth opera-
tion for, as the Second Report itself notes, the carriers and Comsat were
unable to agree on shared ownership arrangements without an FCC
edict.76 There have been constant complaints by Comsat and the car-
riers about the other's failure to cooperate on additional matters.7 If
73. [A]s a practical matter, we believe that any arrangement calling for a substantial
ownership interest on the part of the carriers, however effectively it may function,
involves the risk of diluting responsibility, with resultant risk of possible delays
and undesirable compromises in the decisions affecting the stations and the system
during the interim period. We think this will be particularly true if, as has been
suggested, the carriers were to have 50 percent ownership of the earth stations.
Further, the joint station ownership would require some type of temporary or ad
hoc arrangement, the formulation and functioning of which could involve unneces-
sary delays, uncertainties, and possible conflicts among the parties greatly out of
proportion to the temporary conditions it is designed to meet. In short, we believe
that any joint station ownership during the initial period involves certain risks and
disadvantages which far outweigh any possible gains to be derived; and here we
again take into account that, to a significant degree, the carriers will be able to con-
tribute their knowledge and experience and protect their vital interests through the
means described above.
First Report 1115. (Emphasis added.)
74. Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 816.
75. First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1115.
76. Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 818. Even after the edict, it has taken many months to
arrive at an agreement, and one carrier is apparently still dissatisfied. See 33 Tmzxco:t-
MUNICAMONS REPOmS 6 (far. 13, 1967).
77. Extremely harsh exchanges between Comsat and the carriers have characterized
numerous issues before the Commission in the last few years. The sharp exchanges on
earth station ownership continued up to two da)s before the December issue came out,
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this hostility and the inevitable disparity of interests between Comsat
and the carriers continue to produce "sharp, if not bitter" disagree-
ments,78 development could indeed be held up; also, the FCC may be-
come even more involved in day-to-day operations.
7
Why then, have one of the better Commissions and staffs in FCC his-
tory so drastically reversed themselves and disowned their analysis
just 19 months later, long before the allotted interim was to expire?
At least one reason is clear-Congress 0 and the Commission were eager
to end the squabbling and delay. Comsat on the other hand, was ap-
parently willing to settle for 50 per cent of six stations, in place of 100
per cent of only three with bruising battles with its customers for a
share of the rest. And perhaps there would have been a substantial
delay had the Commission attempted to fully resolve the earth station
controversy at this time,8s although it is difficult to see why the delay
problem could not have been resolved by simply expanding the orig-
inal interim policy to the three new stations. Moreover, the decision
may not even be very significant to Comsat's search for much-needed
rate base. Comsat's rate base problem is so acute that the $19.5 million
earth station increment would not have made much of a dent in its
$200 million of available funds. Indeed, Comsat President Charyk
implied as much when he suggested that the Commission perhaps ought
to abandon the rate base method for Comsat's rate setting because the
necessary capital investment in a satellite system is so small compared
to the volume of business it can handle.8 2
Of possibly greater significance is the shared management of the earth
stations. In a sense, each earth station will be a microcosm of Comsat's
own mixed carrier and non-carrier representation, but with several
important differences: First, the carriers' interest in the earth stations
is much greater than 50 per cent, because in addition to their direct
ownership interest they hold half the stock in Comsat. This, of course,
reduces the general public's ownership interest and earnings potential
from the satellite system.83 Secondly, the carriers' 50 per cent gives
even though the industry knew of the impending decision. See 33 TELECOMMUNIOA'rsONS
REPoRas 3 (Dec. 12, 1966).
78. H.R. REP. No. 2318, supra note 2, at 82.
79. The Commission may also find itself spending time supervising the carriers to
prevent any self-preference in their use of the Caribbean cable.
80. 1966 Commerce Committee Hearings 67 (Senator John 0. Pastore).
81. To avoid delay resulting from conflicting applications Comsat decided to apply
for authorization to build a second antenna at Andover, even though this would not be
as useful as a completely new earth station in the southeastern United States. Comsat
Press Release 1 (October 6, 1966).
82. 1966 Holifield Hearings 515.
83. 1966 Holifield Hearings 365 (O'Connell).
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them what the Commission described in 1965 as "negative control,"'s
the power to block action. This power is even greater than the May
1965 Commission dissenters were willing to grant, 8 for they urged that
Comsat be given 51 per cent so that the stations could be built "without
unnecessary delay, [with] ultimate control in one entity, and efficient
operation.""" In Comsat itself, the carriers have only 40 per cent of the
directorate. Finally the Committee is likely to give the carriers much
greater control over Comsat's operations. Board membership alone
does not seem to have provided the carriers with decisive influence
within Comsat although one cannot be sure.87 In part, this is because
the board meets rarely, generally deals only with high policy, and car-
rier members have frequently abstained88 from meetings and issues.
The earth station committees, however, have plenary day-to-day au-
thority since they will be responsible for
formulating overall policy and deciding on major investments,
types of major equipment and location of new stations, and the
establishment of day-to-day operations of the stations.80
As a result, Comsat will have to work closely with the carriers and the
carriers with each other, despite the many differences.
Shared ownership of the earth stations continues a pattern which has
recently been developing in the industry-joint ventures in the con-
struction and maintenance of key facilities. Many present and most
future cables are to be jointly owned and operated. This is partly to
improve competition with AT&TOO and partly to spread around the
rate base. Nevertheless, the number of partial mergers, including each
of the earth stations and Comsat itself, may become so numerous that
the next step will seem quite natural-full merger of some or all of the
international facilities. Such a merger, advocated by the Commission
first in 195991 and often proposed in varying forms by RCA Chairman
84. First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1115. It was AT&T which originally suggested that the
carriers be given a 50 per cent interest in the stations.
85. Id. at 1110-11.
86. Id. at 1126.
87. See text accompanying notes 170-73 infra.
88. 1966 Holifield Hearings 486 (McCormack).
89. Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 819.
90. See American Telephone 8: Telegraph, 37 F.C.C. 1151, 1156-57 (1964).
91. The Commission's support in 1959 of a proposed merger of the international
telegraph carriers reversed a prior long-standing FCC opposition to merger. See Hearings
on Merger of International Telegraph Carriers Before the Senate Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-168 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
1959 Merger Hearings]. In his testimony John C. Doerter, at that time FCC Chairman,
said he saw no reason for any competition at all in a regulated industry, 1939 Merger
Hearings 152-59. The argument for merger wras also based on the fear that the record
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David Sarnoff and ITT Chairman Harold T. Geneen, has recently
been supported by a high-level intra-governmental committee, and
permissive legislation will probably be introduced in the 1967 Con-
gressional session. In the legislative hearings proponents of merger
will undoubtedly use the joint earth station ownership and operation
as evidence that merged operations are necessary both for efficiency and
because of an industry-wide rate base shortage.
D. Customer Competition Between Comsat and the Carriers
Discussion of the merger problem raises a second major goal of the
legislation-"to maintain and strengthen competition in the provision
of communications services to the public. '0 2 Communications services
are regulated as to entry and price, however, and the role of competi-
tion may not be quite the same as in a non-regulated industry. Indeed,
in the 1953 RCAC case, the Supreme Court held that because of the
regulation of price and entry, the national policy favoring competition
was not fully applicable to the common carrier industry.03
Where there is technological stability, the RCA C holding may have
some validity. In such a context, the primary concern is to ensure a
carriers could not survive Bell Telephone competition unless they merged, although they
were then quite prosperous. Subsequent events have not borne out these fears. Except for
a slight downturn in 1962 the international telegraph carriers have enjoyed a steadily
expanding business. See FCC, 1965 ANN. REP. 62 (1966); INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COM.INIr.
REPORT 23. For a brief summary of the arguments for and against merger, see PRESIDENT'S
COMMUNICATIONS PoLIcY BOARD, TELECOmMUNICATIONS--A PROGRAi FOR PROGRESS 154.56
(March 1951).
Despite the carriers' favorable earnings, merger is again being suggested by the inter-
national record carriers, as indicated in the text. The proposal, with certain variations, is
that all the record carriers and, in the Samoff proposal, Comsat, be merged to form a
strong competitor to the Bell system, with both systems permitted to engage in all
types of communications traffic. See Sarnoff and Geneen letters, supra note 20. More re.
cently, the Intragovernmental Committee, co-chaired by former FCC Chairman E. William
Henry and the President's Director of Telecommunications Management, General James
D. O'Connell, concluded that costs and rates could be reduced, and service improved, by
merging most or all of the international carriers, including in one of the proposals AT&T's
overseas services. INTRAGOVERNMENTAL CoMmrrEE RFPORT 28-30. As a result, the Com-
mittee recommended that the FCC be authorized to approve such a merger, if It found
it appropriate. Id. at 32-33. The arguments for merger presented by this Committee,
which included representatives from the State, Justice and Defense Departments, as well
as the FCC and the White House, seem no stronger now than when they were first set
forth, in essentially the same form, as early as 1951. It is especially interesting that
despite the Committee's conclusion that the international record carriers would be
unable to reduce rates without eliminating duplicating services by merger, id. at 29, the
carriers reduced rates very substantially under FCC prodding, just a few weeks after
the Report appeared. See text accompanying note 152 infra. And if satellites do become
more significant, then the facilities will hardly be too costily for the carriers to finance
individually. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
92. Comsat Act, § 102(c), 47 U.S.C. § 701(c).
93. 346 U.S. 86, 98 (1953); cf. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944);
Seabord Airline R.R. Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 154 (1965); Schwartz, supra note 47,
at 438-44; but ef. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 341, 848.50
(1963) (competition as our basic policy).
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fair price, and theoretically this can be approximated by rate regula-
tion designed to produce only a reasonable profit. Even here, however,
competition may be useful and indeed necessary, for the practical dif-
ficulties of rate regulation are notorious.
Price regulation becomes even less adequate when a major tech-
nological innovation appears or is likely. In a workably competitive
context, the benefits of the innovation will-again, theoretically at
least-be passed along to the consumer by those firms responsible for
the innovation, and the others will have to match the cost or quality
changes regardless of their investment in older, less efficient plant. If
the industry is oligopolistic with substantial barriers to entry, and if
all the major firms have a substantial investment in preexisting plant,
they can delay introduction of the innovation until they have fully
recouped their investment in their existing plant.94
The agency's control over the rate base can be of some use in pre-
venting delay and promoting the innovation; the FCC, for example,
has the power to exclude obsolete plant from the rate base under the
traditional doctrine that the rate payer should pay the utility only for
plant which is used and useful. The Commission, however, has followed
the policy of allowing the industry to recoup its old investment before
requiring full and maximum use of new techniques, and it seems never
to have required a firm to drop plant out of its rate base for obsoles-
cence. 5 The agency's control over entry has therefore become of pri-
mary importance, and it has used this control to inject a certain amount
of competition into the industry, despite the RCAC decision. 0 Re-
lying in part on sections 313 and 814 of the Communications Act of
1934,97 the Commission has stressed that international telegraph com-
94. See discussion at text accompanying notes 48-50 supra, and particularly, the
testimony of an ITT spokesman, for the possibility of such a retardation.
95. See Kefauver Hearings 305-06 (FCC Common Carrier Bureau Chief Strassburg). For
discussion of the "used and useful" concept, see Bo.uBPJGirr, PmucWLEs oF Puatc UruxrY
RATES 213-14 (1961); WVELH, CASES AND Txr oN PuBLIc UTILITY REcu.Ano.N 363-72 (1961).
96. On remand in RCAC itself, the FCC ruled and expressly found that: (1) since
1934 competition had been increasing steadily in radio-telegraph; (2) Mackay and RCAC
(the two carriers concerned) had prospered; and (3) competition was at least partly
responsible for the maintenance of low rates and steadily improving and expanding
service. It also noted that certain complaints about RCAC service disappeared after
Mackay competition was authorized. RCAC, Inc., F.C.C. 55-699 (1955), aff d, 238 F.2d
24 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957). Similar findings have been made
repeatedly in international record communications cases. E.g., Western Union Telegraph
Co., 24 F.C.C. 535, 585, 589-91 (1958); Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. 25 F.C.C. 67
(1958), modified, 25 F.C.C. 1197 (1958). In some instances, such findings were reaffirned
after some experience with the specific competitive situation before the Commission.
E.g., RCAC, Inc., F.C.C. 55-699, Dkt. 8777 (1955); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 26 F.C.C.
566, 568-69 (1959), modifying, 26 F.C.C. 557 (1958) and 24 F.C.C. 667 (1957); ze also 26
F.C.C. 557, 562-63 for a statement of the FCCs competitive policy.
97. Section 313 expressly applies the antitrust laws to domestic and foreign radio
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munication is not a natural or economic monopoly, for the necessary
investment is relatively small, 98 and there is no technical reason for
only one facility.99 As the footnote shows, the TA T-4 decision is the
latest example of the Commission's efforts to maintain competition in
the industry.100
Despite these efforts, which seem to have produced some competition
among the international record carriers, experienced observers have
remarked that this competition does not extend to rates or service, but
only to salesmanship. 10 1 A recent episode in the Pacific, where only the
threat of Comsat competition secured a rate reduction, seems to sup-
communications. Section 314 requires a diversification of facilities by prohibiting radio
licensees from acquiring cable or wire carriers and vice versa, where the effect is to sub-
stantially lessen competition or to restrain commerce in international communications or
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, domestic or foreign. See Mackay Radio
& Telegraph Co., 25 F.C.C. 1197 (1958). It is designed to "preserve competition in inter-
national communications . . . [and] is copied from Section 17 of the Radio Act." S. R'..
No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934). Under this section, the Commission has ruled that
none of the major record carriers was eligible to acquire the Western Union Telegraph
Company's international operations, divestment of which by Western Union was a condi.
tion of its domestic merger with Postal Telegraph. Western Union Telegraph Co., 25 F.C,C.
34, 77 (1958). This condition was imposed in order to avoid the possibility that the
domestic telegraph monopoly would favor its international affiliate over the latter's com-
petitors in allocating international messages, since all messages not in one of the "gate-
way" cities would have to move initially by domestic telegraph and would generally be
routed internationally by the domestic telegraph carrier. Evidence of such favoritism was
found, id. at 87, and charges thereof still continue. See 31 T LEco tMUNICATIONs RrroRrs
23 (June 14, 1965). The danger of such a problem exists with respect to the carriers favor-
ing their own cables over the satellite system. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
98. See RCAC, Inc., F.C.C. 55-699 (1955); but see FCC Testimony, 1959 Merger
Hearings 161-64.
99. The Intragovernmental Committee concluded that the investments now required
are so great as to require shared facilities. INTRAGOVERNMENTAL CoMMITiTr REPORT 25
This does not seem entirely accurate for some of the carriers at least, like ITT, are still
willing to go it alone. Moreover, as noted at text accompanying note 82 supra, Comsat
President Charyk has raised the possibility that the satellite facilities might involve so
small an investment that the rate base method for determining rates may be inappro-
priate and the operating ratio return margin method used in motor carrier regulation
may be more appropriate. 1966 Holifield Hearings 515.
100. In the TAT-4 decision, 37 F.C.C. 1151 (1964), the FCC allowed the carriers to
share ownership in the fourth transatlantic cable, and excluded AT&T from future
alternate voice-non-voice business. Both parts of the decision were expressly premised
on the need to strengthen competition in international communications.
The importance of competition has also been stressed by customers. 1959 Merger
Hearings 386, 388 (Amory Bradford of the New York Times); COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
BOARD, 1951 REPORT (survey showed that customers uniformly opposed a merger of the
international record carriers, many citing unhappy experiences with monopolistic foreign
carriers who allegedly ignored complaints and inquiries because of their monopoly
status, and some of the customers experiencing similar difficulties with domestic Western
Union service after it obtained a monopoly of all domestic telegraph service). See also
INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COMMrIrEE REPORT 16.
101. See Letter from Richard Gabel, of the Transportation and Communications
Service of the General Services Administration, to the author, Sept. 14, 1965, at 3. For
support for this view, see 1966 Holifield Hearings 139-40 (O'Connell); H.R. REP. No. 2318,
supra note 2, at 41; and text accompanying note 152 infra. However, the FCC's specific
findings some years ago do seem contrary to this view with respect to civilian business as
of the 1950's. This applies particularly to its findings in RCAC regarding the reason for the
decline in rates and the increase in services after Mackay entered. See note 93 supra.
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port this more pessimistic judgment. Moreover, the industry operates
under the continuing threat of domination by AT&T. That company,
realizing the potentially enormous magnitude of international traffic,
has made numerous attempts to enter the international field in other
than voice services. It sought, though unsuccessfully, to become the
chosen instrument of the United States in satellite communications.10 2
It succeeded in entering the alternate voice-record field by obtaining
FCC permission to provide such service to the Defense Department
over the first three transatlantic cables, until it became clear that most
of the traffic was record'0 3 and that the record carriers were losing sub-
stantial revenues. And it has been able to obtain permission to offer
limited data transmission services.' 0 4 The basic problem is that the
voice-non-voice distinction which has held AT&T in check so far is very
hard to maintain. Already there are indications that AT&T will attempt
to enter the most lucrative of the leased-line service areas which cannot
readily be classified as exclusively voice or record.'0 5 Where AT&T
does compete with the other carriers, its power is so great and its activi-
ties so widespread, both domestically and internationally, that the latter
are usually at a distinct disadvantage. For example, until recently they
have had to go, with little success, to AT&T to lease cable channels, 10
or to link-up with domestic users.10 Under these circumstances they
have not been able to compete with AT&T. 08 Furthermore, AT&T
102. See Hearings on the Establishment, Ownership and Regulation of a Commcrcal
Communications Satellite System Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 102 (1961) (testimony of NASA Administrator
James E. Webb).
103. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 37 F.C.C. 1151, 1160 n.9 (1954).
104. FCC, 1966 AxN. REP. 65 (dataphone service between U.S. mainland and Hawaii).
105. Support for the carriers' fears can be found in former AT&T Chairman Frederick
Kappel's continued references to the obsolescence of the record-voice distinction and to
the brilliant future of data communications. See Address Before Boston Conference on
Distribution, Oct. 18, 1960, quoted in Response of Western Union International to
Replies of Other Carriers in the Matter of American Telephone & Telegraph Co., [and]
Western Union International, Inc., Applications for Authorization to Lease and Operate
Voice and Television Channels. .. , P-C-6019, at 9 (Aug. 27, 1965); see also Comments
of ITT World Communications, Inc., P-C-6019, at 2-4 (June 14, 1965).
106. AT&T was first authorized to lease all of its telephone cables to the other
carriers for voice and non-voice traffic; with respect to the Hawaii-Japan cables, it was
ordered to do so. So far, however, it has leased only non-voice channels in these cables.
See American Communications Association Statement on Application For Modification
of TAT-i, 2 and 3 to Permit AT&T to Provide Alternate Voice-Record Service to All
Customers, File Nos. 2474-DL-MAIL-64 (1963). The Commission resolved these problems in
TA T-4.
107. See TAT-4, 37 F.C.C. at 1160. For interconnection difficulties, see WUI Response,
supra note 103, at 4-7.
108. Relying on AT&T for cable channels means that they must pay AT&T a
reasonable rate and therefore cannot readily compete in price with AT&T when it offers
this same reasonable rate to the ultimate consumer. See Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d at
433 n.9. For difficulties with this situation in other contexts, see United States v. Phila-
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probably carries more weight with foreign correspondent companies,
especially since a foreign carrier must deal with only the one voice car-
rier but can try to play off the three record carriers against each other.1°D
Communications satellite legislation thus offered a rare opportunity:
if kept from industry control, and particularly out of AT&T control,
the new technology could be used to loosen an oligopoly, to weaken
Bell dominance, or both; if given to the industry, however, and particu-
larly to AT&T, not only would the opportunity for new competition
be lost, but AT&T's control might be even further enhanced.
At first glance, it seems that this opportunity was lost. The unique
aspect of the legislation is the union of Government, the general public
and the carriers. Carrier participation in this union hardly seems likely
to promote either present or future competition. Competition among
the non-satellite carriers is unlikely to be strengthened or even main-
tained by uniting in a joint venture all the major carriers and many of
the smaller ones.11 It is equally unlikely that potential competition will
be fostered by a structure which contemplates numerous interlocking
directorates;"' creates a backward and forward vertical joint venture;112
delphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963); United States v, Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945).
109. This bargaining disadvantage faced by the international record carriers Is one
of the primary reasons for the continued pressure for merger. See INTRAOVERNMENTAL
CoMMrrrrxF REPORT 26. This is a dubious reason for governmental agencies to reduce
concededly effective and significant competition.
110. The initial investment of the domestic and international carriers in the Corpora-
tion is as follows:
AT&T 2,895,750 shares 29%)
ITT 1,050,000 " 10.5)
GT&E 350,000 " 8 .5%
RCAC 250,000 " ( 2.5%)
Others 454,250 " ( 4.5%)
5,000,000 " (50%)
See Communications Satellite Corporation Prospectus 7 (1964).
Although something of a joint venture is also created by the TAT-4 decision, 37 F.C.C.
1151 (1964) and by the decision to allow the carriers temporary authority to offer
television jointly, such jointness is still relatively new in the international record
industry. If many more cables are laid, it may become more common. See INTRACOVERN-
MENTAL COMMITTiE REPORT 18, and text accompanying note 91 supra.
111. There are six carrier representatives on the Board of which three are from
AT&T, two from ITT and one is from the Hawaiian Telephone and Telegraph Company.
These interlocks were authorized by the Commission under §212 of the Communications
Act. Eugene R. Black, F.C.C. 64-793 (Sept. 2, 1964), I-D-294-R-65 (5-5-65) with warnings
that the dangers presented by such interlocks warranted limiting the authority to only
a year under close Commission scrutiny.
For some of the problems raised by such interlocks and by section 8 of the Clayton Act,
see Kramer, Interlocking Directorships and the Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YALIE L.J.
1266 (1950); for recent developments, see BNA, ATRR, May 18, 1965, B-1.
112. The carriers will be buyers of communications services from Comsat, as well
as sellers of manufacturing apparatus, through the carriers' manufacturing affiliates. Fear
of unfair advantage for the carriers' manufacturing affiliates impelled General Electric,
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and provides for substantial minority interests'13 by companies which
are simultaneously potential suppliers, customers, and competitors. 14
And it seems even less probable that AT&T dominance will be weak-
ened by allowing it 29 per cent of Comsat's total voting stock and 20
per cent of its Board of Directors.
The industry is, however, subject to regulation by the FCC which
has evinced an interest in competition, at least apart from merger. If
sufficiently vigorous, this agency interest might offset these structural
blocks to competition, especially if Comsat's management is aggressive
and independent.
The interplay among these forces may well determine the fate of the
satellite experiment; the interaction of these forces in the earth station
dispute and the resultant effect on competition between Comsat and
Lockheed and others to seek the broad based ownership which resulted. See, e.g., 1962
Senate Space Committee Hearings 230 (Hughes). Their victory, however, seems rather empty
for the initial issue of the non-carriers stock has been so widely and thinly distributed
(almost 150,000 shareholders of record as of the third shareholders' meeting) that these non-
carrier hardware companies are not likely to have sufficient stock to elect a director, at
least at this time. Moreover, the first slate of non-carrier directors was relected by the
incorporators from among themselves and it is difficult to see how any non-carrier hardware
manufacturer can ever accumulate enough stock to overcome the hold of the incumbent
directors on the proxy machinery.
113. In addition to the 50 per cent share of the voting common stock which the
carriers were allocated, they also have an unlimited right to buy bonds and/or other
non-voting securities under section 304(c) of the Act. Because such securities may be
eligible for inclusion in the carriers' rate bases, this group will have an especially strong
incentive to purchase such securities. For this reason Comsat may find it much cheaper
and easier to sell such securities to these carriers rather than on the open market, espe-
cially since underwriting costs of such a private offering will probably be less than a
public offering. Such cheaper securities may have to be sold in the not-too-distant
future, because Comsat's present all-equity (common) structure is extremely expensive
and hinders the setting of low rates, which are so necessary to Comsat's most expeditious
development. If the carriers do buy such securities, they will be in an even stronger
position. However, Comsat's currently excessive capitalization may not justify such
additional issues for some time. See notes 6, 27, 33 supra.
114. Decisions which have found such interests objectionable under the antitrust laws
include Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), afl'd,
206 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1953); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich.
1960); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. The Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp.
387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), a/I'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958) (competitors); United States v. E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (suppliers).
Most of the antitrust decisions have ignored the defendant's contention that the
directors appointed by such minority owners would be independent of those who nom-
inated them. See, e.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co.. 114 F. Supp. at 314;
Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. at 181; but ef. Gilman v. Jack, 91 A2d 207
(Sup. CL Me. 1952) (under Public Utility Holding Co. Act. § 17(c), 15 U.S.C. § 79q(c)
(1964), held that a director elected by bankers and sympathetic to their views was not
precluded from serving as director under section 17(c) which bars appointees or repre-
sentatives). Instead, the courts have pointed to the minority director's opportunity to
persuade or compel relaxation of competitive vigor and to learn competitive secrets.
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. The Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. at 394. One
court noted that it would be very difficult to show that a director had been improperly
influenced by the views of his nominator because directorial decisions usually involve
judgmental factors which would be difficult to trace to the influence of the minority's
special interest. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. at 314.
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the carriers, as well as among the carriers themselves, is the subject of
this section.
In one sense, of course, Comsat ownership can improve competition
in the communications industry simply by offering an alternative to
AT&T's present dominance in cable facilities, both overseas and do-
mestically." 5 Moreover, even where the facilities are not owned by
AT&T, Comsat ownership may be the best way to insure non-discrimi-
natory access to satellite communications facilities for all carriers.
Ownership by any one or more of the other carriers may put the non-
owners who depend upon that facility at a disadvantage. If there is a
shortage of facilities (as is likely for several years) or when emergencies
knock out some of the facilities, or simply as a matter of normal com-
petitive behavior, facility owners will normally be inclined to favor
their own business. Furthermore, a major carrier might design stations
to mesh more easily with its own separate facilities, thus placing non-
owners at a competitive disadvantage. Other subtle methods of self-
preference can also escape the eye of a heavily overworked Commission
staff. Finally, the earth station owner may charge its competitors virtu-
ally the same price that it charges customers, thus making it unprofit-
able for its competitors to compete for those customers.
During the legislative debate, concern over these problems prompted
Congress expressly to declare nondiscriminatory access to users to be
one of the primary purposes of the legislation and one of the Commis-
sion's main responsibilities." 6 The carriers and Comsat extensively
debated the access issue in the earth station controversy, but the Com-
mission treated it as secondary in the First Report, saying only:
In addition to the factors considered above, we have not overlooked
the important public interest considerations affecting (a) uni-
form and non-discriminatory access to the system . . . . In our
judgment, based upon all the data now available . . . [this] im-
portant public policy consideration would be served at least as
well under the policy we have decided to adopt as under the joint
ownership proposals." 7
In its Second Report it merely included the concern for fair access on
its list of pertinent considerations, 18 perhaps in the thought that Corn-
115. Domestic use may turn out to be Comsat's biggest market. 1966 Holifield Hearings
510 (McCormack); an FCC spokesman has also implied that it may be the only place
where Comsat can manage to obtain enough rate base, id. at 747 (FCC Common Carrier
Bureau Chief Bernard Strassburg).
116. See Comsat Act, §§ 102(c), 201(c)(2), 47 U.S.C. §§ 701 (c), 721(c)(2).
117. First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1116. See the summary of grounds for the decision, id.
at 1119. The "factors considered above" are speed and efficiency.
118. Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 818.
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sat management and partial ownership would inject a neutral force to
protect against possible carrier self-preference.
But improving carrier access to facilities is not Comsat's sole poten-
tial impact on retail competition, for Comsat could itself provide "re-
tail" services. Comsat's role as retailer has been the most hotly debated
issue before the Commission. Competing carriers have claimed that if
Comsat were permitted to sell to the public, they would wind up in the
same position, vis-a-vis Comsat as with AT&T-facing a competitor
who is also the monopolistic supplier of the facilities necessary to
compete with it. Moreover, they would face a competitor to whose
success there is a substantial national commitment. 10
The prospect of such Comsat competition has been quite real. Com-
sat indicated early that it aspired to be more than a carriers' carrier.
It negotiated for some time directly with the Defense Department,
one of the largest users of communications service in the world, -0
and in July 1966 the Department announced that it had chosen Comsat
over four other carriers to supply the Department of Defense with 30
Pacific channels for three years for $19 million, a decision which was
later changed.' 2 Comsat obtained an even larger contract with NASA
for the latter's manned-flight-to-the-moon (Apollo) program. Although
Comsat has disclaimed any interest in offering service to the "general
public," this offers the carriers small comfort, for the truly lucrative
business comes from large users such as the Government (particularly
the Defense and State Departments and NASA),' -2 news gathering or-
ganizations, airlines, and large industrial organizations. 23
119. T and RCAC cited this danger of Comsat competition and the TAT-4
decision as arguments against Comsat's exclusive control of the earth stations. See First
Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1110, 1115. In its First Report, the Commission found the TAT-4
circumstances quite different with little explanation. First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1115. It
obviously had no need to mention the issue in the Second Report, since Comsat had
already been. excluded from retail competition by the earlier Authorized User decision.
120. H.R. REP. No. 2318, supra note 2, at 23.
121. In February 1967 the Commission ordered the contract assigned to the carriers
as soon as possible. F.C.C. 67-163 (Feb. 3, 1967). The original choice of Comsat was the
main focus of the extensive hearings held by the Holifield Committee, 1966 Holifield
Hearings. The salient facts and considerations are set out in that committee's report,
H.R. RFP. No. 2318, supra note 2.
122. The U.S. Government accounts for some 15 per cent of our international com-
munications, 1966 Space Committee Hearings 99 (O'Connell). In 1965, it accounted for
some 70 per cent of total leased circuit revenues with 90 per cent of voice grade circuits.
Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d at 433. Revenues from leased circuits were described as an
"important, if not indispensable part of the carrier's total receipts." Id. at 432.
123. Comsat set forth its aspirations as limited to the following situations:
(i) ['f] the carriers fail to provide a requested service via satellite although capacity
is available (ii) there is a need for development of technology or provision ot new
satellite services and then only during the early developmental stage, and (iii) in
which case and any other case there is a finding that the public interest would be
served by the authorization.
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Comsat has obvious reasons for seeking this direct business. In the
first place, Comsat could thus ensure that user traffic goes over satellites
and not over other facilities. Even a carrier which can use the satellite
system is likely to want to take the message part or all of the way over its
own or other cable or radio facilities. Also, Comsat can more easily pro-
mote new uses for satellite communications if it deals directly with the
user.124 Direct dealings with customers would also give Comsat some
power over retail price. It might be able to propose rates based solely on
its own costs which, at least in the Defense Department 30 circuits con-
troversy, have been much lower than rates charged by the carriers.
Since Comsat's hopes for high volume depend on lower rates and costs,
this possibility is particularly important. These same rates, however,
may still be higher than those Comsat would have to charge as a carriers'
carrier in order to allow its carrier-customers a profit on their services
to the ultimate customer. 12 5 And finally it may be much easier for Com-
sat to expend its $200 million on plant investment, if it can provide the
ultimate user with supplementary equipment at the earth station for
him to lease.1 26
Earth station ownership affects these issues as well. If Comsat did not
own any part of the earth stations, it would be unable to serve custom-
ers directly without leasing these facilities from its competitors and
putting itself, to some extent, at their mercy. Its charges to the user
However, and of utmost importance, Comsat claimed "that it is authorized by the
Satellite Act to provide service directly to the Government in any instance when the
Government requests service." Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d at 423. (Emphasis added.)
The possibility of direct Comsat service is, of course, not limited to international service.
Many buyers, including the Federal Government and the broadcasting networks have
long been forced to deal largely with AT&T for their domestic communications services.
Allowing Comsat to deal directly with domestic users might weaken this AT&T dom-
inance. The possibility of some domestic satellite competition was adverted to brlefly
by the Bell system in recent attempts to justify an 8 per cent rate of return on domestic
service. See, e.g., 30 Txr acoMUNic:rxoN R.PORs 21 (Aug. 17, 1964). The Commission
has recently instituted an inquiry into the various domestic possibilities of satellite com-
munication including requests by news and broadcasting media for direct use of
Comsat, Notice of Inquiry, In the Matter of the Establishment of Domestic Non-Common
Carrier Communications Satellite-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities, Dkt.
No. 16495 (March 2, 1966), which produced the Ford Foundation's suggestion that a
separate satellite system for television be established with a percentage of the network
savings from satellite usage turned over to the Educational Television Network. Hearings
were held on this proposal by the Senate Commerce Committee, 1966 Commerce Cor-
mittee Hearings, and more will follow. In addition, NASA has begun to investigate the
feasibility of transmitting radio and television directly into homes by satellite, which
would also bypass AT&T's present monopoly. Wall St. Journal, Nov. 26, 1966, p. 1, col, 1.
124. 1966 Holifield Hearings 489 (McCormack).
125. The danger that Comsat might charge the carrier the very same price as the user,
thus putting the carriers at a great disadvantage if Comsat competed with them, was
adverted to by the FCC in its decision denying Comsat the right to deal directly with
the customers except in unique or exceptional circumstances. Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d
at 433.
126. Cf. 1966 Holifield Hearings at 747 (Strassburg.).
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would also have to reflect the rate of return the carriers were able to at-
tain for their earth station investment.'-- Thus Comsat would face the
same disadvantages that the record carriers have suffered in their deal-
ings with AT&T. Also, unless Comsat owns the earth station complex, it
will have difficulty reaching the non-governmental ultimate user since
it lacks the long-standing reputation and sales experience of the car-
riers.2 The user's direct contact is more with the earth station than
with the satellite; indeed, earth station design, especially during these
early years, may have to be tailored to fit users' needs,'2 and the neces-
sary technical arrangements between the earth station operator and
user are likely to further business arrangements.
Though these same arguments were made by the carriers to support
their fears of being as dependent on Comsat as they have been on
AT&T, the situations seem fundamentally different. In the foreseeable
future, the carriers' dependence on Comsat will not even begin to ap-
proximate their far greater dependence on AT&T. Comsat obviously
does not compare with AT&T in overall size, power, and influence, and
satellite communications will have to grow enormously before it begins
to handle as much traffic as AT&T's vast cable network. Moreover,
AT&T is in no way dependent on the other carriers, whereas Comsat
is likely to need their patronage for some time to come, especially if
carrier-owned cables remain of great competitive significance. Even if
Comsat were allowed to do some retail business, its primary business
would almost certainly be that of a carriers' carrier.m0 Finally, Comsat
has far fewer links with foreign carriers, one of the sources of AT&T's
127. Although it would charge the carriers for use of the satellites, which the carriers
would also have to pass along to the customers, the satellite charges are likely to be
less than the earth station charges. The importance of earth station ownership to carrier
rates can be seen in RCAC's two-price quotation to the Defense Communications Agency
for the 30 Pacific circuits: $3690/month assuming RCAC participation in earth station
ownership compared with $4848/month assuming exclusion of RCAC from earth station
ownership. 1966 Holifield Hearings 592.
128. Comsat apparently has no difficulty making contact with governmental users.
See generally, 1966 Holifield Hearings and H.R. REP. No. 2138, supra note 2.
129. The satellite itself only amplifies and relays the signal from one station to another,
from which the signal is again processed for territorial transmission.
130. Comsat will obviously be in a stronger position toward the carriers so long as
facilities are in short supply. Nevertheless, Comsat and the carriers will still be far more
even in bargaining power during this period, than are AT&T and its customers, especially
since Comsat will remain a relative novice in the communications business for some time
to come. Moreover, in some respects, the shortage of facilities has not yet materialized
with respect to any but voice or Pacific traffic. Of the 66 satellite channels leased by the
end of 1965, 64 were for telephone use. 1966 Space Committee Hearings 41 (Char)k).
Moreover, the Early Bird Satellite was operating only 16 hours a day in part because
there was not enough business to warrant the necessary high expense of an additional
8 hours operation. Id. at 52. But this may soon change as the projected expansion in
communications demand takes place.
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international power, although Comsat's position in the international
satellite consortium could change that.131
The Commission has settled the question to a large extent in its
Authorized User decision in June 1966.132 After a year's consideration,
the Commission unanimously ruled that Comsat was not to offer any
"retail" communications services, even to the Government, except
under "unique or exceptional circumstances" to be determined by the
Commission.133 The decision was expressly based on a fear that "if
Comsat were allowed to siphon off the most profitable part of the busi-
ness [the leased circuits] from the carriers,"' 3 4 they might have to raise
rates to the general public in order to survive. "Certainly such detri-
ment to the vast majority of users for the apparent benefit of a few
larger users would be in derogation of the objectives of the Act."'u8
Nor was the Government treated too differently. Though the Govern-
ment "clearly does" have a "special status under the Satellite Act," to
allow Comsat complete freedom to deal directly with the Government
might deprive the carriers of substantial portions of their income.1, 0
Direct government service would therefore be allowed only in "unique
or national interest circumstances," as the Commission found the NASA-
Apollo contract to be. 37 The Commission also noted that Comsat would
be allowed to provide service directly if the carriers "fail or refuse to
meet reasonable demand therefor, although they are or would other-
wise be capable of doing so in accordance with general service offer-
ings.' 38 Finally, the Commission declared that the carriers would be
expected to reduce their rates to "fully reflect the economies made
available through the leasing of circuits in the satellite system. Failure
of the carriers to do so promptly and effectively will require the Com-
mission to take such actions as are appropriate."' 3
Although the decision was not surprising with respect to non-govern-
mental users, the limitation on Government-Comsat dealings was
quite unexpected, in view of the express provision in the Act for Com-
131. Some of the carriers have complained that Comsat has been trying to undercut
their relations with their foreign components.
132. Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d 421 (1966).
133. Several different formulations were used, often within the same paragraph:
"unique or exceptional," "national interest," "unique and extraordinary." Id. at 435.
134. Id. at 431.
135. Id. at 433.
136. Id. at 433-34. This, of course, assumes that the Government would often choose to
deal directly with Comsat, a not unreasonable assumption in view of the present apparent
cost advantages and the governmental commitment to Comsat's success.
137. Id. at 431-32.
138. Id. at 432.
139. Id. at 434-35.
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sat service to Government,'"0 and for a while Comsat and the Govern-
ment seemed prepared to challenge the decision in the courts.14'
One of the most significant results of the decision is that Comsat will
not be permitted immediately to pass on its full cost advantages to the
ultimate users. Although Comsat's first tariff has not yet been approved,
the Commission has reaffirmed its long-standing policy that rates for
communications services are not to depend upon the facility used.
Rather, "composite rates" are to be charged which represent an aver-
age of the costs of all facilities, new and old,142 in order to prevent users
of the new facility from receiving lower rates than users of the old.143
According to a Commission spokesman, "this practice has promoted
the improvement and expansion of service by encouraging the carriers
to modernize their plant promptly with reasonable assurance that their
investments in existing plant will not be unduly affected." 44
Such a policy has obvious advantages, especially if Comsat's cost
advantages were to be used only for "cream skimming" while the far
less lucrative general message service, which accounts for most of the
140. Comsat Act, §§ 305(a)(2), 305(b)(4), 47 U.S.C. §§ 735(a)(2), 735(b)(4). With respect
to nongovernmental usages, former FCC Chairman Henry and Common Carrier Bureau
Chief Strassburg have long indicated that they see Comsat as primarily a carriers' carrier,
and this view was reflected in the original Notice of Inquiry:
The provisions of the Satellite Act make dear that it was the intent of Congress that
the Corporation would have, as its principal domestic operating function, the furnish-
ing for hire of channels of communication to communications common carriers author-
ized by the Commission, pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to
provide services by means of communications satellites (Section 103(7) and Section
305(a)(2) of the Satellite Act). While the Satellite Act leaves open the question of
whether the Corporation may be permitted to furnish satellite service or channels
directly to users other than communications common carriers, it would appear, from
an overall reading of the legislative history that any such activity which might be
authorized should be a limited one and should be consistent with the Corporation's
primary role as a "common carrier's carrier."
Notice of Inquiry, F.C.C. 65-523, at 2 (June 16, 1965).
141. The President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications, who is also the Direc-
tor of Telecommunications Management for the Federal Government, immediately ob-
jected, warning that the Government might set up its own satellite system. See Letter
from Gen. James C. O'Connell, June 28, 1966, reprinted in 1966 Holifiteld Hearings 804-05.
His position, concurred in by Comsat, was that Government.Comsat usage is not subject
to FCC control, but depends solely on decisions by the Executive Branch. And the
Defense Department announced a week later, despite the FCC decision, and without
obtaining any FCC authority, that it had chosen Comsat as its supplier of the 30 Pacific
channels mentioned earlier. Under strong congressional pressure, see H.RL Rn,. No. 2318,
supra note 2, at 7, 49-56, and with carrier promises of reduced rates on all communications
services, whether on cable or satellite, the Department later agreed to a reassignment of
the contract to the carriers as soon as possible. See F.C.C. 67-163, at 2, 3 (Feb. 3, 1967).
142. This is pursuant to traditional Commission policy. See 1966 Holifteld Hearings
704 (Strassburg).
143. Id. at 332 (O'Connell). For an example of the possible differences, compare
Comsat's $4000/month per circuit charge to the Defense Department with the carriers'
proposed $7100/month. See H.R. REP. No. 2318, supra note 2, at 4.
144. 1966 Holifield Hearings 704 (Strassburg).
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traffic, was left to the carriers and forced to support itself.14" The public
interest may well require a diversification of facilities, and it is certainly
not in the public interest to let Comsat use its present cost advantages
to inflict serious harm on the carriers before they get a chance to try
to make cable technology into a viable competitor.14 But such a policy
has its social costs-it could make international communications more
expensive, and it inevitably slows the growth of the industry in general,
apart from the new technology, in order to protect the value of possi-
bly obsolete equipment. 47 Under rate-base averaging, the speed with
which cost savings are passed on to the public depends, at least in part,
on the ratio of new to old use. If low-cost satellites, for example, con-
tinue to account for only a small share of the traffic, composite and
therefore satellite rates will remain high. But unless satellite rates do
come down, satellites will not be fully and efficiently used which, in
turn, will keep costs high. Thus, the use of composite rates can doubly
retard development of the satellite system.
Nevertheless, the opinion leaves some room for Comsat as a retail
competitor. Comsat will probably continue to try to get some retail
business, and many of its potential customers, including the Govern-
ment, are likely to support it, if only to avoid paying a middleman's
profit. The Commission clearly retained the power to authorize such
direct service,148 and it left itself very broad discretion to allow direct
service to the Government, the most important of all such business.1 49
The Commission's power to regulate price is enhanced by the mere
existence of an alternative satellite system, even if Comsat does not
actually compete directly and the carriers continue to transmit by cables
and radio. The Commission showed how this can work in the Author-
ized User decision itself where, as part of its ruling, it declared:
We therefore expect the common carriers promptly to give further
review to their current rate schedules and file revisions which fully
reflect the economies made available through the leasing of satel-
lite circuits. Failure of the carriers to do so promptly and effec-
145. For a discussion of the extremely difficult problem of designing an equitable rate
structure, see BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES REGULATION chs. 16-20 (1961).
146. The Government business is so important that one carrier would go out of
business without it. 1966 Holifield Hearings 287 (O'Connell).
147. Indeed, it has been said that the carriers have a good deal of obsolete equipment.
1966 Holifield Hearings 867 (O'Connell-Roback exchange).
148. See Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d at 427-28: "We think that the Act clearly
empowers the Commission to authorize service to entities other than carriers."
149. The governing standard is the flexible "national interest circumstances." Id. at
435. Indeed, even "unique or exceptional" can be interpreted by the Commission in many
appeal-proof ways. For discussion, see H.R. RE'. No. 2318, supra note 2, at 34.
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tively will require the Commission to take such actions as are
appropriate. 50
These rate reductions, however, went much further than the economies
from satellite use, as the Commission itself realized, when it imme-
diately added:
Even though satellite circuits are not now and will not for some
time be available to all points to which users presently lease cir-
cuits . . . carriers should also reduce charges to many points to
which satellite circuits are not now available. 51
The carriers immediately made very substantial rate reductions, which
were apparently long overdue,5 2 even though they are not yet using
satellite circuits to any substantial degree. 5 3 Thus, the Commission
effected a rate reduction without a formal rate hearing and thereby
obtained the benefits of free satellite competition while avoiding some
of the dangers.
But close regulation of this sort is impossible unless there is an ag-
gressively independent satellite communications system for the Com-
mission to use as a realistic potential competitor, and here the Earth
Station decision creates problems. The committee arrangement subjects
to a carrier veto any Comsat plan involving earth station design; indeed,
it gives the carriers some indirect control over any Comsat plans, for
they can use their earth station powers as leverage. Also, if Comsat
develops plans to compete for ultimate-user business and seeks to make
appropriate arrangements for earth station transmission, such plans
will be subject to scrutiny by the carriers, and this loss of secrecy can
have unfortunate effects on Comsat's ability to compete.
Denying Comsat complete earth station ownership thus weakens
its role as a potential competitor. While the Authorized User decision
was probably inevitable and almost certainly sound, the final Earth
Station decision seems much less so. Given the realities of the rate base,
competitive and other factors set out above, it was also probably un-
necessary for carrier protection, especially after the Authorized User
ruling.
150. 4 F.C.C.2d at 434.
151. Id. at 434-35.
152. Apparently, rates had remained extremely high for some time, 1966 Holifield
Hearings 328 (O'Connell), lending support to those observers who consider the industry
not very competitive in price.
153. Only AT&T is using a substantial number of the Early Bird circuits it was
authorized to obtain. See Letter from Ben F. Waple, Secretary, FCC, to the author,
Feb. 13, 1967 (AT&T is using 65 out of 74, ITT and WUI are each using 1 out of 10, and
RCAC is using 2 out of 10).
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E. Procurement Competition
Equipment procurement is another area in which the Commission
has an explicit legislative mandate to encourage competition. Section
102(c) calls for "maximum competition . . . in the provision of equip-
ment and services by the system," with special concern for small busi-
ness, and authorizes the FCC to regulate procurement for the system
by Comsat and the carriers. Comsat's structure, however, prejudices
achievement of this objective by building in an advantage for certain
suppliers who will own most of the stock. Almost all of the carriers are
major equipment suppliers; indeed RCA and ITT are primarily manu-
facturers. 154 Many of their competitors are not shareholders, and none
of these competitors is known to have a representative on the Board
of Directors. Competing non-carrier suppliers 15 therefore urged the
FCC to award earth station ownership to Comsat, on the ground that
Comsat would not have the same incentive to favor one supplier or
another as would the carrier affiliates of such huge manufacturing en-
tities as AT&T, ITT or RCA. The non-carrier suppliers feared not
only that the associated suppliers would win a few early contracts, but
also that these companies would develop invaluable early know-how
which would forever foreclose independent suppliers.'50 The carriers
themselves made a similar argument when they claimed that without
some earth station ownership, they could not continue effective research
on earth station technology.
In the First Report, the Commission dismissed the issue of procure-
ment favoritism on the ground that the procurement regulations which
it had earlier issued, and any necessary amendments thereto, would
guarantee equal treatment. 57 Whether the regulations can be relied
upon still remains to be seen.58 Even if the carrier-manufacturers do
not own part of the earth station, they still have six directors on the
Board who will be entitled to full information on all aspects of the
154. Levin, supra note 5, at 320, 344; 108 CONG. REc. 7522 (May 2, 1965) (Remarks of
Congressman W. F. Ryan).
155. E.g., Westrex Division of Litton Industries.
156. Actually, the amount of procurement by Comsat is likely to be a relatively small
part of the picture. Far more important is the experience gained in building these facili-
ties which may then be used when other entities construct satellite-related facilities. For
example, each of hundreds of local television stations will need television receiving facili.
ties when satellites become widely used for television. Similarly, the airlines, who are
counting heavily on satellites for an urgently needed improvement in their vast com-
munications systems, will need a great deal of ground equipment.
157. First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1119; see 29 Fed. Reg. 848 (1964), C.F.R. § 25.151.
158. Most of Comsat's procurements have been by competitive bidding, but in many
cases its owners are among the bidders, and insider knowledge can be very useful in such
competition. For suspicions as to the large number of contracts going to insiders, sce
Kirkpatrick, Antitrust in Orbit, 33 GEO. 'WAsH L. REv. 89, 115 n.103 (1964).
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system, including the earth stations. Moreover, the carriers will be the
immediate users of the station, and as the Commission originally noted,
"Comsat can be expected to seek appropriate advice and assistance from
those entities upon which it must depend for its revenues."'15
The Second Report should cause non-carrier competitors even more
apprehension. Now the carriers are placed in a very powerful position
over earth station "major investments" and "types of major equip-
ment."160 Even if they did not have such powers, partial ownership
enables a carrier to obtain vital knowledge of plans and specifications
which can provide a head start in the bidding. Moreover, as indicated
above, ITT and RCA are building and planning to operate earth stations
in other parts of the world. Since, under the decision, the carrier-own-
ers of the American stations are allowed ownership because they will
be the entities using the stations, it would seem not unreasonable to
expect them-and perhaps even to encourage them-to incorporate
and use the technology with which they are most familiar.161
II. Implications and Reflections
One indisputable fact that emerges from this review of Comsat's first
four years is the pervasiveness of the conflict between the old and new
technologies, and their respective backers. These conflicts will inevita-
bly erupt in the Board room, forcing the carrier directors into hope-
lessly irreconcilable fiduciary duties, resolvable only by abstention. 0 2
Abstention cannot always be the answer, however, for Congress pre-
sumably authorized these directors' presence on the Board partly in
order to give Comsat the benefit of their knowledge and experience.10
But if they do participate, can the carrier directors really be expected
to devote their best efforts to Comsat as its development threatens their
markets and investment? Most of these men are directors as well as top
executives of their respective carriers, for which they have worked
159. First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1114-15.
160. Second Report, 5 F.C.C.2d at 820.
161. In one respect Board representation by carrier-suppliers has had virtually no
effect: the Hughes-created high altitude synchronous satellite has been chosen by Comsat
for its permanent system, over AT&T's Telstar and RCA's Relay, both medium-altitude
satellites. This, however, seems attributable primarily to the obviously overwhelming su-
periority of the synchronous satellite, and it is not dear that merit will generally win
out in less obvious matters.
162. There has apparently been a substantial amount of such abstention. 1966 Holi.
field Hearings 486 (McCormack). One example occurred during discussion of the earth
station ownership. See Address by RCA Chairman David Sarnoff, May 26, 1965, Washing-
to, D.C., p. 9.
163. Eugene R. Black, F.C.C. 64-793, at 2-3 (Sept. 2, 1964).
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much of their lives. 164 In this clash of fiduciary duties, 05 is there any
doubt where their primary loyalty will lie, especially since part of the
reason Congress authorized their presence on the Board was to pro-
tect their nominators' interests? L6
These same conflicts will erupt in the earth station committees, with
similar consequences, except that in that arena there will not be even
a clash of fiduciary duties since the carrier representatives will clearly
and undividedly represent the carriers. The presence of carrier partici-
pation in the committees may also significantly reduce the power of
both the already feeble Presidential directors 07 and of the general pub-
lic directors. In the Board room, the carrier directors have only six out
of the fifteen directors and, when there is some carrier-director absten-
tion, even fewer. In some cases at least, the three governmental appoin-
tees may join with the six general public directors to outvote the car-
riers. It will therefore be to the latter's interest to decide as many
important questions as possible at the earth-station level where they
have at least a veto, unaffected by conflicting fiduciary obligations. 08
Thus, one effect of the earth station decision may be to strengthen sig-
nificantly the carrier voice in the overall affairs of the Corporation and,
correspondingly, to weaken the other interests. 00
Nevertheless, carrier influence on the Board does not seem to have
impaired Comsat's momentum. It is much closer today to an opera-
tional system than was anticipated in 1962, when the Act was passed.
The very sharpness of the Comsat-carrier exchanges implies that the
carriers have been unable to control Comsat fully from within; indeed
to an outsider, it is hard to see how Comsat could have acted very much
more aggressively or independently on most of these issues.170 As one
164. Messrs. James E. Dingman, Horace P. Moulton and Harold M. Botkin are or were
high officers of AT&T (former Vice Chairman, Vice President and General Counsel, and
Assistant Vice President); Ted B. Westfall is Executive Vice President of IT&T, and
Douglas S. Guild is President of the Hawaiian Telephone Co. COMUICxATIONS SATELLTI:
CORP., ANN. REP. 23 (1965).
165. The common directors are Black and Westfall (ITT); Guild (Hawaiian), and
Dingman (AT&T). Ibid.
166. Compare First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1114.
167. Schwartz, supra note 4. It may well be that, as in many corporations, management
really controls the enterprise and the Board as a whole has relatively little power.
168. It may not be difficult to develop a unified carrier position on many of these
issues, for all the carriers will have some participation with other carriers in at least
some stations.
169. The express authorization for joint Comsat-carrier earth station ownership
would seem to permit such accumulation of power. But see First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 11 ,
170. It might have asked for a greater right than it did to serve users directly, but
the Commission's hostility to any degree of direct service has been dear for so long, see
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example, the fact that two of the carriers had a strong interest in a
medium orbit system17' did not keep Comsat from choosing the high
altitude synchronous system created by Hughes, a non-carrier. More-
over, Comsat initially defeated the record carriers in a head-on con-
frontation for the 30 Pacific circuits contract, despite strong carrier
efforts both within and outside the corporation. In the earth station,
authorized user and cable-satellite conflicts, Comsat has not seemed par-
ticularly timid or inhibited. More significantly, the carriers' ultimate
victories in the earth station, authorized user, 30 circuits, television'72
and interface issues came about not (so far as one can tell) because
Comsat succumbed to internal pressure but only because the FCC ruled
for the carriers.173
Do these events then prove the wisdom of the original decision to
"meld" the interests? Why indeed have the carriers been unable to use
their insider position and Board representation to blunt and slow
Comsat's drive? Are Board membership and ownership participation
in a competitor or customer really quite unimportant?
It is of course too early to answer any of these questions with assur-
ance, but a few points may be noted. In the first place, there is some
reason to think that despite the foregoing clashes, the carriers may ex-
ercise more control over Comsat than may appear. For example, a recent
Fortune article disclosed that Comsat had originally indicated to editors
of the New York Times that it planned to support and expand the Ford
Foundation proposal for subsidizing educational television with the
savings from satellite usage. This, however, entailed direct network
access to the satellite system, bypassing AT&T. The plan "apparently
fared worse in the Comsat boardroom than in the Times' private dining
room" and Comsat dropped the idea. 74 This incident could well be
but one out of many, for one serious problem here is that, the outsider
really cannot know what conflicts have been smothered within the cor-
text accompanying note 140 supra, that the more modest request seems strategically
sounder. Its willingness to compromise on the earth station issue may also have reflected
reasonable strategic considerations.
171. See note 161 supra.
172. The Commission originally authorized Comsat to offer international television
service directly to the networks, see 31 TELCOM3,NiCATOS ,Pxors 2 (June 28, 1965),
but when the carriers protested, the FCC reversed itself and restricted television trans-
mission to a joint venture of all carriers. 31 TmxCOMMUNCAT1ONS Rsmrars 1 (July 19, 1965).
173. However, in both the Caribbean and earth station controversies, Comsat and the
carriers seem to have agreed in principle on the ultimate compromise solutions before
the FCC issued its rulings.
174. Silberman, The Little Bird That Casts a Big Shadow, Fortune, Feb. 1967, pp. 108,
225. The article provides a good sketch of some of the issues discussed herein.
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poration, especially since both Comsat and the carriers may wish to
prevent public exposure of these differences. This problem of knowing
what occurs within the boardroom may get worse, for at the moment,
Comsat's more public activities are still of enormous interest to Con-
gress and the general public because of its novelty, glamour and the
controversial circumstances of its birth. As public interest wanes, the
problems arising out of Comsat's incestuous corporate structure will be
even more difficult to detect and resolve.
Secondly, Comsat presently has a new and vigorous management,
fired with the enthusiasm that is natural to those entrusted with so
novel, revolutionary, and significant an enterprise. Here again, time
may take its toll as charisma settles into routine. It is also difficult to
know what will happen when a Comsat move requires secrecy from the
carriers for its success. Most of the carrier-Comsat controversies, such
as the earth station dispute, the authorized user question, the 30 circuit
contract, and others, do not seem to have involved market strategy of
the kind requiring confidentiality. However, the Authorized User deci-
sion expressly permits Comsat to serve users directly where "new uses
of satellite facilities" are involved. Some of these new users may com-
pete with established services, and carrier representation on the Board
and in the earth station committees could preclude the secrecy neces-
sary to achieve effective marketing or dampen Comsat's initiative.
Finally, it must be kept in mind that at the moment and for some
time to come, Comsat is extremely independent financially. It will not
need additional capital for many years except to build up a debt ratio.
When it does have to go to the capital market, it may find it cheapest
to obtain debt or equity capital from the carriers; indeed, if such flota-
tions are substantially cheaper than the open market, it may be re-
quired to do so by the FCC which has control over its capital structure,
especially if the Commission is still trying to help the carriers build up
their satellite rate base. In that case, Comsat may become much more
dependent on the carriers than it is now.'7
These considerations caution against dismissing the conflicts built
into Comsat's structure as irrelevant on the basis of events so far. More-
over, these same events, together with certain other considerations, also
justify a more affirmative criticism of the "meld"-chosen instrument
technique for at least this regulated industry176 on the grounds that:
175. 1962 Senate Space Committee Hearings 401 (Katzenbach).
176. As noted, the problems in an unregulated industry may be quite different though
equally complex. No attempt is made here to deal with such problems.
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A. carrier participation in ownership adds too little to justify any
harm that it might produce;
B. use of a private chosen instrument creates special problems re-
gardless of industry participation; and
C. the success of the "meld"-chosen instrument technique depends
too much on a rare combination of vigorous regulation and aggressive
management.
A. The Lack of Benefits from Carrier Participation
The earth station controversy shows that carrier participation is
neither necessary nor even useful in achieving the intended benefits.
First, the carriers' involvement was supposed to provide Comsat with
the benefit of their knowledge and experience.177 But despite the Com-
mission's belated reacceptance of this position, the previous analysis
shows its weakness. In addition, the sharp conflicts between Comsat and
the carriers have hindered the free flow of their expertise to Comsat,
for the carriers admit that they do not want to build up a dangerous
competitor.178 Indeed there is reason to think that Comsat has not re-
ceived full cooperation from AT&T, while all the record carriers, in-
cluding those with Board representation, have complained about an
information gap.'1 9 WUI, with the concurrence of other carriers, has
therefore proposed an industry liaison committee, in addition to Board
membership, but so far Comsat has shown no interest 8 0 Moreover, if
there were a real desire for such an exchange, neither ownership nor a
liaison committee would really be necessary in view of the constant
and inevitable business and other contacts between Comsat and the
carriers.' 8'
Secondly, the carriers and the FCC argued that satellite ownership
would help the carriers integrate the satellite technology into their
existing facilities, 82 a contention they repeated in the earth station
controversy. This argument was never very persuasive, for the carriers
have been interconnecting with facilities owned by others for a long
177. 1962 Commerce Committee Hearings 68.
178. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1966, p. 41, coL 6.
179. 1966 Holifield Hearings 616-23.
180. See 1966 Holifield Hearings 616-17, 618-19.
181. See id. at 618, 620; First Report, 38 F.C.C. at 1115. For an example of such in.
formal cooperation, see a recent report that Comsat was sending a group of its technicians
to ITT Federal Laboratories for four weeks of earth station training, Comsat Press
Release: New Comsat Earth Station Technicians to Start Training, June 18, 1966.
182. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10115 and H.R. 10138 Before the House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 402 (1962) (FCC Chairman New-
ton N. Minow).
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time, and without serious technical difficulty.188 In neither earth station
decision did the Commission consider the point of sufficient importance
to discuss or even to mention, even though integration involves the earth
stations more than any other segment of the satellite system. The car-
riers also contended that their direct relationship with the public re-
quired them to control all segments of the communications system.
Again, and despite its earlier acceptance of the claim, the Commission
gave it no weight in the earth station controversy.
A more significant theoretical argument, pressed by the carriers in
both the legislative and earth station controversies, is that carrier own-
ership would permit lower satellite rates immediately, for the carriers
could subsidize such rates by revenues from other services.184 This argu-
ment is based on sound and traditional regulatory practice, and would
ordinarily have particular force against a company like Comsat that
uses expensive all-equity finance and requires a high rate of return.83
But Comsat, far from being short of funds, has yet to find an outlet
for most of its $200 million capitalization and can probably afford some
low return years for a while. Also as the prior discussion shows, Comsat
rates are still lower than the carriers' cable rates and will eventually
drop even further.8 6 Thus the carriers are really trying to raise satellite
rates, not lower them. Moreover, the partial ownership device adopted
by Congress would not help to reduce Comsat rates even if they were
higher, since the carrier-stockholders are not allowed to commingle
their funds with Comsat's.
The last argument for carrier participation is the need to protect
the carriers against Comsat. As the preceding pages have tried to show,
a powerful intruder could have a healthy impact on the communica-
tions industry. Equally important, the authorized user, earth station,
television, 30 circuits, and interface experiences have shown that with
the FCC on their side, the carriers do not need share participation, and
that when the Commission is not with them, it is of little help. More-
183. 1962 Kefauver Hearings 330.
184. Hearings, supra note 182, at 403-04.
185. See Comsat Revised Report on Rates and Revenues Requirements 1967-1971, Dkt.
No. 16070, § A, p. 5 (Nov. 10, 1966). Comsat is seeking a 12 per cent return. The average
utility earns from 6 per cent to 7 per cent and even AT&T, whose interstate rate of return
has seemed uncontrollable by the Commission, see note 200 infra, hovers around 8 per cent.
Many of AT&T's intrastate rates of return are much lower. See, e.g., Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph, 53 P.U.R.3d 513, aff'd, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 401 P.2d 353 (1964)
(6.3%).
186. See Hearings on H.R. 14921 before Independent Oflice Subcommittee of House
Appropriations Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 931-32 (1966) (testimony of FCC Chairman
Henry on Comsat's television rates). Comsat's charges are only conditional, and may be
revised pending the outcome of its first tariff proceedings.
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over, the carriers do not always have uniform interests--sharp conflicts
exist between AT&T and the record carriers, and between the inter-
national and domestic carriers.8 7 Share participation does not protect
all of their interests equally, for only three of the carriers have Board
representation, 88 and the other major record carriers have com-
plained about being left out. 89 Thus, if industry participation via share
ownership does provide some protection, it is chiefly for the financially
powerful, like AT&T and ITT. Indeed, insofar as AT&T and Comsat
together might have interests adverse to the record carriers, the latter
may wind up with only nominal representation.
B. The "Chosen Instrument" Policy
Even without industry participation, using a private regulated entity
as a chosen instrument has serious defects, which the satellite contro-
versy dramatically illustrates.
In the first place, the "chosen instrument" device forces the Govern-
ment to be benefactor, promoter, and regulator. It gives the regulatory
agency, in particular, the role of patron as well as overseer. Though
most agencies have become protectors of the industry they are supposed
to regulate, °0 this role is rarely quite so explicit and is hardly to be
encouraged, especially when the beneficiary is a single company. More-
over, the agency's role as promoter of the new company can conflict
with its often open and older role as protector of the existing industry,
which may in turn produce additional friction with other governmental
agencies which have their own particular uses for the new technology.101
187. For example, a conflict is brewing between Western Union and the international
carriers. Western Union has asked for full control of all earth stations on two grounds:
(1) regardless of the ultimate source or destination of the message, all earth stations in
the United States are parts of the domestic communications network for a domestic
carrier will have to make connection at the earth station; and (2) earth station ownership
by the international carriers would enable them to get a toehold into domestic com-
munications when satellite communications enter the domestic scene. Although the first
point is obviously a make-weight, the second raises serious issues respecting the wisdom
of a sharp separation between domestic and foreign service. Western Union Petition to
Deny Pending Resolution of Policy and Technical Issues, File No. 10-CSG-P-66 (May
10, 1966).
188. AT&T has three directors, ITT has two, and Hawaiian Telephone has one.
189. See, e.g., 1966 Holifield Hearings 619 (RCAC).
190. See REAG AN, Tm MANAGED EcoNoMtY 197-98 (1964); Loevinger, Regulation and
Competition As Alternatives, 11 ATrrRrusr BuLL. 101. 122-23 (1966).
191. See the recent Department of Defense-FCC controversy about whether the Ex-
ecutive has complete control over when it may deal with Comsat, text accompanying note
141 supra.
There may also be a tendency to mold foreign policy to further the interests of the
"chosen instrument." History contains more than a few instances where national policy
was tailored to fit private economic interests, and an express governmental commitment
can only encourage it.
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Satellite communications provides an especially dramatic illustration
of some of these weaknesses. The Government's commitment to the
commercial and technical success of the satellite venture is obvious
and has often been noted. 92 But the Comsat legislation also calls for
low rates and possibly non-profit or low profit services which can only
make satellite communication services less profitable.10 3 Rate setting is
especially difficult where the Government's own business is concerned.
As noted earlier, the federal government purchases approximately $2-
$3 billion of communications annually,10 4 and accounts for some 15 per
cent of international communications. In many cases, the bill could be
lowered if the Government either built its own satellite system or re-
ceived preferential rates as a partial reimbursement for its investment
in satellite technology,1g9 or even if it was simply able to take full ad-
vantage of satellite economies. But the commitment to the success of
Comsat and to the well-being of the carriers has foreclosed the Govern-
ment from economizing in any of these ways.' 9 On the other hand, the
FCC's commitment to protecting the existing industry, as reflected in
the Authorized User decision, has brought it into sharp conflict with
other governmental agencies with other objectives.10 7
192. See, e.g., Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Satellite Communications (Military-Civil Roles and Relationships),
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 112-13 (1964); Address by Comsat Director Bruce G. Sundlun, Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, March 11, 1966. This commitment may
also affect decisions on domestic matters. Recently, Senator Magnuson, Chairman of the
Senate Commerce Committee declared with respect to the Ford Foundation's proposal for
a separate domestic satellite system for broadcasting:
The Commerce Committee will take a look at the Ford Foundation proposal in the
next session of Congress. In the meantime there are other proposals we will consider
and do what is in the best interest of ETV to keep it alive.
I am hopeful that it won't interfere with the operation of Comsat because we made
a commitment to the American people when we passed the bill (the 1962 Act): that
if they put their investment in Comsat and give it their support, that we do what was
best government-wise and regulation-wise to keep it going.
We have that commitment and you can't just say we are going to abolish it over-
night because there is some other idea for ETV.
32 TLEcomMuNICATIONs REPORTs 13-14 (Nov. 17, 1966).
193. Comsat Act § 102,47 U.S.C. § 701.
194. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
195. The need for such preferential rates for Voice of America operations was stressed
by then USIA Director Edward R. Murrow. Hearings on the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 2d Scss. 128-
29 (1962). Preferential rates were granted by the railroads in the nineteenth century in
return for governmental aid. Cochran, The Social Impact of the Railroad, in Tie RAIL.
ROAD AND THE SPACE PROGRAMi-AN EXPLORATION IN HisroRICAL ANALOGY 173 (Mazlish
ed. 1965).
196. To the contrary, there is apparently a governmental policy to use Comsat even
if more expensive. Hearings on Missile and Space Ground Support Operations Before the
Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1966).
197. See text accompanying note 191 supra.
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C. The Necessary Conditions to Success
Both of these last two factors-the absence of otherwise unobtain-
able benefits from carrier ownership and the defects of a private chosen
entity-place an unjustifiable burden on a very infrequent combina-
tion: vigilant regulation and independent management. The indepen-
dence of Comsat's management is crucial because much of an agency's
vigor, particularly the FCC's, depends on the existence of vigorous and
competing litigants. 98 If Congress in the Communications Satellite
Act or the FCC in the Authorized User and Earth Station decisions had
allowed for a greater degree of competition between Comsat and the
carriers, close regulation would not have been so important. But the
structure they did create is so full of potential conflicts and opportuni-
ties for insider self-preference that constant policing will be needed.199
However, the FCC had not had a very impressive record in regulating
the common carrier industry prior to the recent leadership of former
Chairman E. William Henry and Common Carrier Bureau Chief Ber-
nard Strassburg,200 and the regulatory pendulum may swing again.
Indeed, there are signs that it already has. '
An additional and crucial factor in this context is that we as a nation
have never really developed a communications policy to guide the
FCC. 0 2 Nor does it seem appropriate for a regulatory agency to develop
one on its own, for this is primarily a matter for Congress. Yet the
Commission has been invested with so much power, especially with
the advent of a revolutionary new technology like satellite communica-
tions, that it is molding the nation's entire communication system,
198. This is one reason for whatever success the Commission has had in regulating
the international communications industry. It has been far less successful in regulating
Bell's monopolistic services. See text accompanying note 200 infra.
199. See Eugene Robert Black. F.C.C. 64-793, at 34 (Sept. 2, 1964) (the conflicting
fiduciary duties will require dose Commission surveillance).
200. AT&T's domestic and overseas business has seemed virtually uncontrollable. The
Commission has continually failed to keep AT&T's interstate return down to reasonable
levels, and it is still unable to adequately regulate the AT&T-Western Electric relation-
ship. See Hearings on H.R. 14921 Before Independent Offices Subcommittee of House
Appropriations Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 913 (1966). Part of the reason in the past
has been a lack of interest in common carrier regulation, but, as indicated by the October
1965 order instituting the first formal telephone rate hearing in FCC history, this may be
changing. For critical analysis of the FCCs domestic telephone regulation prior to 1962, see
Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Organization and Management Survey of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission for the Bureau of the Budget 271-309 (1962), reprinted in Kefaurer
Hearings 653; for its poor regulation of international voice traffic, see Johnson, Com-
munications Satellites and Telephone Rates: Problems of Government Regulation, Rand
Memorandum RM-2845-NANA (1961); and Kefauver Hearings 331.
201. See Wall St. Journal, Mar. 8, 1967, p. 32.
202. The need for such a policy, to be developed by a cabinet agency like the recently
created Department of Transportation, was recently called for by the President's Special
Assistant for Telecommunications Management. 33 TELcosssumacxo.Ns RMMonrs 1
(Mar. 13, 1967).
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without any explicit guidance from Congress or discussion of overall
objectives.
Finally, whatever private entity is chosen, and no matter how vigor-
ous and effective the regulatory performance, it is not clear that the
agency can be relied upon to recapture some of the community's in-
vestment in the new technology. It is a good deal more likely that
absent congressional or other public pressures, an overworked and
understaffed agency will concentrate solely on its traditional tasks of
regulating rates and entry and protecting the industry and will hesitate
to take on the industry in a bitter fight to skim off some of its profits
for the community at large.
It is still much too early to make final judgments about the wisdom
of the satellite legislation. It does seem already clear, however, that the
method chosen offers few benefits and much potential danger. Until
we have more evidence of the benefits that result from creating such
a "meld of variegated interests," the Comsat experiment does not
deserve emulation.20 3
203. The Ford Foundation has attacked Comsat's attempt to obtain control of domestic
television transmission by satellites, for reasons similar to those advanced here, saying:
Not all the parties to this proceeding are equally interested in the rapid adaptation
of the communications satellite to domestic uses. Except for those of us who seek a
broadcast satellite service, Comsat is almost alone in its desire to move forward with
a domestic satellite system as quickly as possible, but even Comsat must be sensitive
to the interests of the carriers. The carriers, including AT&T, are understandably
concerned to insure the most economic use of their existing microwave and other
ground facilities and are naturally inclined to relegate the satellite to a supplementary
role."
[To give Comsat a monopoly of all satellite services] would be unprecedented, even
for public utilities. . .The problem is made more acute by Comsat's statute under
which six of Comsat's 15 directors must represent common carriers; these six directors
are not free to concentrate on the development of communications satellites--they
must also be aware of, and sensitive to, the large common carrier investment in micro-
wave and other land facilities.
Ford Foundation Supplemental Comment In the Matter of the Establishment of Domestic
Communications Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities, Dkt. 16,495, at 16-17,
20 (April 5, 1967).
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